A herce ius ission is tal ing place among the lest internationalty ever since Alexis 4 sipras decide d to capitulate to the de mancis of the Europeans and agre ei: to sign and implementa thimi Memorandurn for Greece. The discussion centres Ino stly on whether the SyriZAGOVernnnent should have had a Plan B prepared for dealing uvitia the resulis of a TreXit' should thie negotiations fati. It is 1 ny contention that sucia a discussion rnisses thre potnian 1 falis into thie trap of presenting thie issue as an opposition hetuve en rennaining in thre EuroZOne and adopting a national curreri cy. It is this opposition that was used as thie weapon os choice both by the Greelc and the Europe an political elites to criista the Syriga GOUernn erit. Inste ad of searching for a Plan B it is urgent to understand the o Vective nature of Plan I and asses s iis dynamic and potency. The Syriga GOVerninent's de Dat in the hancis of far superior forces niasks thre realstrength of iis negotiation tacti cs and niisl ea lingly potnis to a lack of strategy that was bound to lead to a deseat. HoweVer, is uve look heyond the harsh termis of the agreernent uve realis e that the tacti cs of the negotiations are cormpatibi e uvitia a reUolutionata strategyir radicatly changing not only Greece hut also Europe, and proh ahly heyond. The firsthasic principi e of thus strategy is that Greece cannot malce it alone. In oriter to succe sed ingetling rid of the Mernorandurn, European poli cies must radicatly change. The se condprincipie is to Inalce fure that the people, both in Greece and in Europe, stay inforrned an dbe kept on boam1 and made aware that the efforis of the Greelc GOVerrinnent uverere asonable VPhile the Europe ans uvere hilareas onable and Vindictive. The thimi principieuvas to attempt to split the opposing forces. Whether these principies uvere Conscious lyapplied by sipras and Varoufalcis or not, they uvere illowed with re asonable precisionand rnet uvith fair success. The insistence in the Europe an scope of their goals uvas absolute, the transparen cy of the negotiations was unprecedented, leading to uvides pread support for the Greeli position not only annong the intelligenista hut also, n ore inaportantly, winning OUer public opinion both in Greece and in Europe. DriVing a MVed gehetuve en the Institutions ' canae clos e to success uvitia the Anaericans forcing the IMF topuviisla iis repori just heire the Greelc Referendum and the Europe an Connimission and France Cleariy perturbed by Schauhle's Grexit plans. I sipras' acceptance of the Europe an ultimaturn mari s the end of this phase of the drama. Whatever our opinion abo ut the wis dona of his decision, the reat is sue nouu is the correctassessinent of the possibilities for test politi cs in Greece nouv. Gindin and Panticla are quite correct in opposing a hasty eXit Do In the Euro Zone dernan ded on the basis of Syriga's fallure to Muin in their negotiations uvith the European elites. They has e their View on the faci that it is exactly Syriga's intent to negotiate a deat with in the Euro Zone that won theelection for thern
As for counselling Syri Za to ris k losing iis gOVerning status, it nee cis to hie notest that Syri Zaal ready faceti this question in the run up to the 2012 elections, and concluded that theresponsi hile decision uvas to enter the state and do eUerything it could to restrain the neoliberal
derno cratic dis mission hut in the en d responsibility for thelm uvas fuZZy and unci ean Asopinions uvithin SyriZa Uari ed widely, decisions uvere talien MVithin a reginae os intense arguiments and contradictions uvith whicli not eUeryhody uvas happy. Nevertheless, the conlponenis' of Syriga stuck together in their joint atterripi to stern the rnis ery of the Gree k peopte iniposed by the Mernoranda and ille Troilia. Notvvithstanding the lack of effective innat clerno cratic decision rnaring procedures, Syriga dici not degenerate into an autocratic structure. On the contrary, decisi Ons at eUerystep seented to continand thre support of thie majority of thre Party rnembers and certainlyof thre Party supporters. There uvas sonae grurnhling on thre test of thie Party, hut that uvas neUer a serious Concern . In faci, thre rnolley crowd that formi sed Syriga had forged a nexul ind of Party, o ne that could he far to the lest of anything rernote ly rnainstreani and at thesanie tinae coni and the support of the rnasses. Integral to that Party uvas thre complete Dee dona os expression, open discussion and the total lack of the ne ed for a Muthip. in retro speci it is easy to se e why this uvas possitile. The iacticar poli cies that foraned theesse lace of SyriZa MVere Uery nio dest inde ed. Is uve look at the Thessaloni a Prosram me uves tali he annaZed at the rno desty of iis propos ais. Only a few de cades ago such a pro gran1Π1e would he the goUerlamental programi ne of nnainstreani Europe an SocialDenno cracy. Pasol 's munding prograrrinae, The 3 4 OfSepterin her Pros an Me, uvas far na ore radical and far reaching thian anything discus sed in Syriga since iis fornaation. Thiat pro gramnae included sucii 'extrenae' de nancis as thie 'socialist trans forniation Os society' MVorker's controi of the uniis of production', 'socialisation of the financiat systena in iis totality, the inaportant uniis of production and thie big inapori and expori trade'. it advocated 'Free and coimpulsory education', abolition os private education and participation Os studenis in the planning of education and thie running of te ac linginstitutions. Sonne of threse de nancis uvere eUen irripiennented during the Andreas
hien SyriZa asto unded everybody by conting a close se conci in the first elections os 2012t iere uvas no coherent party prograt ne for gOUeri nent. AS a leading SyriZa cadre putit at the tinae 'uve are not ready to goUema hut we nnust goUems. Had SyriZa VPon the se condelection os 2012 thie potentiat for a liuge revolutionary up Surge would probab ly beunt eas hed. HoweUer, the lack of any preparation for such an eventuatity would in ali probability lead to chia otic devel Opimenis. A race belween puriing together a Viable poli cyand disaster uvould hiave been thie reality for thre illowing Dw nnonilis. The Party uvas spared such a position os respons ibi ty and at thie sanae tinae it uvas shocked into thie realisation thiat is they uvere to hie serious they should put their acttogether. They Very suviftly ImoVed to imprDUe their internat pm cedures in oriter tobe conie a functional party, proce eded to put together a goUe unental progranime, culminating in thie Thessaloniki Prograna nate, and pald nn ore attention to their gras fro Ois Organisation nationuvide. Intentationalty, they used their enhanced standing to forge relations uvithi fori nations like Podernos in Spain and lenisi organisations and parties in Europe and eis euuliere. Not least, they attracted thre sympathy of a uvide range of intellectuals and academics whio putilis hed prolificatly on thre uvore of SyriZa, thitis greatly in creas ing thre VPorid-wide appeal of thie Greeli eXperinient. Thie chroice of sipras as threcandidate of thie Lest for thie position of thie President of thie European Comnussion is indicative of the changes thie rise of SyriZa hrought Ahohit. By the tinne SyriZa won the elections in Ianuata 25, 20l S, a clear poli Cy Daniework uvas in place, Sonaething that allowed theni to quickly forrn a governnnent and storin both Greece and Europe MVith an energy and effectiUeness that surptased eUerybody. It is easylo Jay for their detractors, both Right and Len, to present these actions AS AIT Ogant an ditile, to ridicule them as the result os inexperience and the fassure of theota hut thatuvould miss the achi eve ments of the first sive monilis of this Governnient and a fassure tosee how clo se it cani e to success. To se e these sive monilis as a period of 'tacti cs hut nostrateo' is Only superficiatly correct hut dis regariis the realities of the decision naal ingproces s in SyriZa and Inisses the essentiat correciness of the Greeli stance froin the potnt of Uiew of a reUolutio nary strategy. The reality is that it is only fro in the perspective os a
d In niy Marcia analysis of me Greel siluation, tilled Resoran and Rem tution in the 21sit Cenitur', I di eis me parallel between Varoufalcis role in the negotiations with the Europeans and Alkibiades' inception of ths41S BC Sicilian Expedition hy Athens. Subsequent eUenis strongly reinfor e this parallel.
Very radicat strategic objective that the actions of sipras and Varoufalcis in these siverno nilis can he understo od and appreciate d. Such a strategy waS pr bab ly neVerforanulated, or eUen innatly discus sed in Syri Za hut it uvas hi ly in place during the negotiations. lis lanain airn uvas to win the Greeli and Europe an naasses to the SyriZa cause. 4 sipras and Varoularis seern to have been clearer than the rest of the Party on uultat theyuvere after hut the lack of a collective understan ting on that ted in thie en d to thie collapse of their project. 4 sipras could not in the end withstand thie pressure and Varoufalcis could not puli the Party to his potnt of Vieuv. Once thre two feti apari, there uvas no way theycould have continued their ambitious carnpaign. Thre SyriZa decision niaring proces s hi ad
In 2008, capitalisna hau iis second global spasna. The linanciat crisis set OD a chain reactioniliat pus hed Europe into a clownward spirat that continues to this clay. Europe's presentsituation is not ni ei ely a threat for MVOrkers, for the disposses sed, mr the bankers, mr social
crisis uvit i ni eas ures strictly MVithi in thie legal and political Daniework of thie European Union and thre Euro Zone. Is it a pro granune Varo hilaris expected thre Europe ans to adoptand 'fave' Europe an capitalis 1 n froni iis etfῖ l don't think so. It is far niore likely that thie proposais are triade in thre spirit os exposing and destabilis ing thie poli cies of rnacinessperpetrated by thre Europe an institutions. A po inter to that effect is probab ly given hythie very titte Ofthie propos ais: A Modest Proposa ille it reflecis accurately thie contendos thre propos ais, One cannot 1 Ss thre allision to another, Uery political texi, A Modest PTOyOSal, hy Ionathian Suvin, written alimosi tyrree centuries ago. Thiat texi leaUes no do ubi about iis objectiUes. It is a caustic satire of thre thypocrisy of tris i society thiat allowed poVel ty and Suffering an long thie peopte is ille allowing thie richi to live in luxury an dignore thre agony of thie poon Thie Thessaloniki Prograt Me uvas a perfeci tool for eXposing thre callousness of thre