The philosophy of Spinoza as contained in the first, second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics" and in extracts from the third and fourth

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conceived ithout his amrmation. ence dein a)this assirmation belong to the essence of the idea flatriangle an is nothinibu that idea. What, have sat of this volition is since e too it a random tobe sal also os ever volition, namely that it is nothingelse than an idea Q. E. D.

understandin are ne and the fame thing Q. E. D. Scholium. illi thisis have et aside the ourse commoni assigne to error. e have hoWn bove, moreover, that falsit consist meret in the privation involve in mutilate an confuse ideas. ence a salse dea, in sociar ascit is false, does no involve certainty. When e say therefore, that a man acquiesces in halcis false, an has no doub oscit, e domo saythat heris certain, butini that he does no dotibi, orthat he aquiesces in halcis false, because no Causesare presen to mali his imagination aver on thispoint See 44 schol. Consequently ho eve much a manbe assume to lingo What is false, e neve speah of him asieing certain. y certaint We mea Something positive se 43 and schia in no meret the privationo doubi By the privationis certain ty on the ther hane, e mean falsity. ut for the fuller explicationo the precedin proposition it rem alias first, o ive

jections that canis made to this ou doctrineci and, third, I have thought it orth whil to indicate certainuseful resulis os his doctrine, that Lma remove every

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scrupte. I say certain of thema for the mos importantones illi belle understood rom hat, shali sayin Par V. I begin then With the sirst mini, and I Warn m reaclers to distinguis caresullyiet een an ide-that is, a conceptionis the ind-and the mage of things e imagine. It is necessary, in the seconditace, to distinguis belwee ideas and the words by Whic We indicatethings. For these three, mages Words, an ideas, areb many either holi confounded, o distinguisheclwit sussicient precision or no distinguishe with sussicient Care. ence the are holly ignorantis this doctrine of the will, a doctrine the acceptance of whichristrui necessary, as et for speculatio as for the wiseordering os life of course those Who th in that ideas consist in images forme in usi meetinibodies persuade themselves that the deas of things of whichiseca formis resembliniimage remo ideas, but mere figments Which, fram by an exercise of re Will. Theyclook upo ideas, then, a passive piCtures Pon pane and possessed by this prejudice, thendo notsee that an dea, in that it is an dea, involves assirmationor negation. In the seCondilace thos Who confound the word Wit the dea, or even it the assirmation involve in the idea, thin that the can illisometh in contrar to What the perceive, When the amrmor en in ord oni somethin Contrar to halthe perceive. e hoWever, illis able asil toshahe of these rejudices, ho fixes attention ponthe natur of thought in hicli the conception ofextension is no involve in the east and who thus clearly understand that an idea although it is a modeo thin king consist nei ther in the mage of something, nor in ores For the essence of Word and of mages

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is composed of bodit motion solely, and thesei notinvolverat at the conceptionis thought. These femadmonitions may sussice, o I pas to the aforesaid objections. hes se of them is-and theythin this undisputed-that the wil extend surthertha the understanding, and there ore is different fromit. Oreover, the reason hy the thin the illextends further than the understandiniis that the say the have found by experience that thesdomo nee agreater poWer os assenting-amrming-or denying, inorde to assent to an infinit of other things, whicli,ed not perceive than we no have ut that the donee a reater po er os understanding. The wil isthere ore distinguished rom the understandin in that the lalter is ad finite, and the forme infinite.

Seronae, the objectio can e alsed that experienceseem to each nothin more clearly tha that, cansuspend judgmen an not assent to What, perCeive. This is also confirme by the fac thatis oneri faidio be deceived in sociar asi perceives something, butoni in sociar asis assent o dissenis. For example, he who imagines a Winge hors does not on this account, admit that there is a Winge horseri that is, he cloes not on this CCount, mahe a mistahe, unieSSh at the fame time admit that there is a ingedhorse ExperienCe, therefore, eem to leach nothingmore clearly tha this that the Will, o the power ofgiving assent, is free, an different rom the power ofunderstanding. T irae, the objectio can e madethat ne assirmation oes no seem to Contain more realit than another that is, e do no seem to need a greater poWer for assirmin to e true liat is true, than sor amrmin tot true omething that is false but, do perceive that ne de has more realit or

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do I se Why the facult os illing should e sal tobe infinite ather than the facult os perceiving. Iustas by the facult os illing, can affirm an infinity

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o perceiving, ut noto greater po er of illing, thanae has give us. his is the fame a saying thatis God should choos to mali iis comprehen an infinit os otherieings, it ould incleed, be necessar forhim o ive us a reater understandin than he hasgi ven us, but not a more generat de of bein Mithwhich to embrace this infinit of beings. Fo we haveshown the wil tome a universat, that is, an idea bywhich e explain ali partiCular volitions or, ather, What is common to them all. When, herefore, Per- sons belleve that this idea common to ali volitions-this universa ide-is a faculty no onde the say this

faculi extend infinitet beyon the limits of the un- derstanding. A universat is predicated equali os one, o severat, oris an infinit os individuals. The seconae objectiones an swe by enying that we have a re poWer of suspendin judgment. When e say that oneris suspendin judgment, e say onlythat he sees heloes no adequalet perceive a thing. There ore suspendin judgmen is reali perception, an no fre Will. To understand this clearly let usconceive aio imagining a horse, an no perceivinganythingislse. Since this mage involves the existence of the horse i 7 cor.), and the bo does no perceive anything that dentes the existence of the orse hewil necessarii regar the orse a present, nor illhei abierio doub iis existence, although e is notcertain f it. his e ait experience in reams, butes domo belleve there is anyone ho hinks thathe, While hesis dreamin g, has a fre poWer os suspend- in judgmentis the things e is reaming, and of bringincit about that he hould not ream e sees the things e is ream in he ees. Nevertheless, ithappens that even in ream suspen judgmen

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more, I admit that no ne mahes a mistahe in o aras he perceives that is, Dadmi that the imaginations of the mino, in themselves considered, involvem error 17 schol. h; ut I den that a man, in sociar as hel erCeives, ahes no affirmation. What is it to perceive a Winge horse, is noto affirmoliatis horse has

o dissenting unles the mage of the winge horse ere connecte With an dea that dente the existence of said horse, or unlescit perceived iis idea os a in geohors tote inadequate, in hicli caserit ould eithernecessarii den the existenceis sat hors o necessarii doubicit. With this Iahin I have answered the sed objectionalso amely, in hoWing that ilicis a universat, predicate of al ideas, and that it signifies ni What is

common to ait ideas that is, an assirmation. of this, Consequently the adequale essence, in sociar ascit isthus abstracti conceived musti in very dea, and for his reason must e the fame in all. ut his isno true oscit in sociar ascit is considere a constitut- in the essence of an idea, for in socia particular affirmations differ romisach other a much as do ideas them selves. For example the assirmation involve in the de of a circle differs a much from that involvedin therideam a triangi a the de of a circle oestrom the de of a triangle. In the secon place Iden absolutei that, need an equa power of thinking to assirm that tot true that is true, an to amrmthat tot true that is salse These two amrmations, from the potnt of vie of the mino are relate to each

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PROP. 49 THE MIND. 23other as ein to not-being, for there is in ideas nothin positive that constitutes the essence of falsity 35 anae scisoL, and 7, sciso in One must note there- fore, specialty ho easit we ah mistahes hen e Confound universals With particulars, an entities of the reason an abstractions illi rea things. Finalty a concern the fourre objection, Psa that quite admit that a man in such a state of equilibrium one, nam ely, Who perceives nothinibu hunger

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With this I have fulfilled the tas I set myseis in this

scholium, an here I bring to a close his ou seconclΡart. In it Pthin I have explaine themature of the human in an iis properties sufficienti a tength, and sociar a the dissiculi of the subjeci admits of it, With clearness. And I have set forti trullis from hichcani inferred, a Wil in par appea from ha sol-loWs, much that is ver excellent an exceedingly use-ful, and that it is necessar to knOW.

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PAR III.

Mosae of thos Who have Writtemon the emotions ando human conduci seem to reat, not o naturalthings, that obe the genera laWs os nature, ut of thing that aremulside os nature. Indeed the seemto conceive of man in nature as a realm With in a reaim. For the regar man a rather disturbing than following the orderi nature, as havin absolute poWer Verhis actions and a not ein determine by anythingbut imself. Further, the cause of human infirmityan inconstanc the attribute, o to the generalpOWer o nature, buto I no no What defeci inhuman nature, Whicli, accordingly they beWail deride, treat it contempt, or as osten happens, denounce an he who has learne to carinthe mos eloquently orthe mos ingeniousi a the infirmit of the humanmin is regarde a a prophet. There ave no been lachinidistinguished men to hos laborand industry

cellent things concerning the right conductis life and have ive to mortat counseis fuit os isdom butye no ne sociar a I know, has determine thema ture an strength of the emotions and what the indcan do toWar heeping them illi in bound s. Iano , indeed that that mos celebrate man es artes, although he belleve the in to have absolute poWer

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tions by thei firs causes, and ais to hoW the way in .hic the in can have absolute contro ove theemotions but in m opinion a least, he inoWs nothingbut the acutenes os his own great ind, as Ι hali prove in the prope place for I Wish to return to those ho ould rather denouncem deride human emotionsor actions than comprehen them To theserit illno doub seem strange that I underlahe to reat of human defecis an follies by the geometrica method, and wisho prove by rigi reasoning What the proclaim to e inconsistent illi reason, unmeaning, absurd, and dreadfui But m reason is this Thereis nothinii natur that canis attribute to a defecti it for natur is alWay the fame, an iis VirtueandioWer of actiniis every here ne and the samen that is the laws and ules of nature, accordin towhicli at things comerio pass, an are Change fromone formo another, re very Where an alWay the fame, an consequently there hould e also one and the fame method of comprehending the nature of things of Whateveratnd namely through the laws and

genera rules of nature Therefore the emotion ofhate, anger, enVy, etC., Considere in themselves, follo from the fame necessit an power os natureas do allisther particula thing and ence Wn to definite causes, through,hicli the are comprehendedan have definite properties as Orth of Our noWledgerus the properties of an other hing in the mere contemplationis,hicli, tali delight. Pshali treat, theresore, of the nature an force of the emotions and of the power hic the in has ver them, by the fame method as, in What recedes, I have treate ofGod and of the mines an I shali conside human