The philosophy of Spinoza as contained in the first, second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics" and in extracts from the third and fourth

발행: 1892년

분량: 221페이지

출처: archive.org

분류: 미분류

161쪽

APP. XXX HUMAN BoNDAGE. 147 is necessar to se many aliments of different oris.

The humaniocly, incleed is compose of very manyparis of different natures, hic nee constant and varie nutriment, that the whole od may be equallycapable o ali hos actions that may follo from iis nature, and lience, that the in also may be equallycapable of iraming many OnCeptionS.

XXVIII.

But the strengi of each man would scarcet sussicet procure this di no me mutuati ai each other. No money has furnishemus a representative for everything, henc it has happene that iis image is ontio greatly occupy the in of the masses because the can carcet imagine an hin os pleasure nac- companted by the de of money a iis Cause. XXIX. But this is a vice ni With thos Who see money,

no frommeed, nori account of thei necessities, butbecause the have learne the aris of gain, Wit Whichthe carry them selves ostentatiously. For the est, the nouris their bod from force of habit, but spar- ingly bellevin that the lose a much of thei substanc a the spendi the preservationi their body. But thos Whoano the true valueis money, and regulate the measure of their ealth accordin to theirneed, live content Wit litile. XXX. Since therefore, hos things are good that helmthe paris of theiod to persorinthei functions and pleas-ure consist in his that the poWeri man, in soriar as

162쪽

Superstition, o the contrary, appears to maintain that to e good whic gives ain, and o the therhand that bad Which gives pleasure But a me haveat ready sai IV, 45, MOLii, o ne ut the enuioustahes pleasure in m infirmit an misfortune. Forthe reater the leasure illi hich e re affected, the greater the perfection to hich, pass, an consequently the reater our participatio in the divine natureri an a pleas ure hic is regulate by a rue

XXXII. But human poWer is ver limited an is infinitely

163쪽

APP. XXXII HUMAN BONDAGE. 149exceede by the power os externa causes there- fore e have no absolute poWer o turn to uradvantage the thing that are externa to us. Never-theless, e Wil bear illi equanimit thos things that happen to us Contrar to hat a regar formur profit demands is, are conscious that we have doneou duty, and that theso eris have could no have reache so far a to enabi us to voi them, and that we are a par of the whole os nature, hos order

e follow. I We clearly an distincti comprehendthis that partis us hicli is define as intelligence- that is, the est parti us-Will e entiret satisfied illi his, and wil strive to persevere in his satisfaC-

factio oni in the truth in o far, thereiore a Verighil comprehen this in s far cloes the endeavor of the belle partis us harmonige illi the orde of the whole os nature.

164쪽

PREFACE.

PAs now to nother artis the Ethics, and thisis concerne Mith the method o way that lead toFreedom. I hali here, accordingly, reat of the poWer of eason, and shallistio , irst, hat influen cereason itfel can have pon the emotions and SeCond, What the freedom or blessednes of the mindris. Fromthis e hali se hoW much more poWer the wis manhas than the ignorant. The surther inquiries, hoWever, ho an in hat way the understanding should ehrought to perfection, an in hat anne the Odyshould e care for that it a be able properi toperform it functions-these domo belong here Thelalter concertas mediCine, the former, logic. Here, therefore, I hall, as I have aid, reat ni of the power of the in ori reason, an I shali sho , firsto ali ho area and of what soricis the contro it has ove the emotion in compellingi restraining them. That we have no absolute contro ove them, Phave jus demonstrated. et the Stoic thought that theyare absolutet dependenti ou Will, and that, Cancontro them absolutely. Nevertheless, the were compelle by the protes of experience, an no in-deed by theiriwn principies, o admit that it requires no litile practice and exertion to controllanda restrain

165쪽

them. his omeone has attempte to ho by the

illustratio of the w dog si I remember rightly ,

Cartes favore noto litile. Forte maintaine that the ou or in is unite chien With a certain parto the brain calle the pinea gland by means of hicli the in perceives ali the motions that are excited in theiod an also externaliodies, and whichthe in ca move in diverse Waysi meret Millingio do so. held that his litti gland is o suspended, in the iddie of the brain that it an emove by the leas motionis the animal spiriis. eheld, in the secon place that this gland may be suspende in the iddie of the brat in a many dissedient Ways a there are different Ways in hicli the animal spirit impinge pon it and that further, therema be a many different traces imprintedisponcit asthere are different external objecis that prope the animal spirit toWard it. Whencerit happens that is, afterWard, by the volition of the foui movincit in various Ways the gland e suspende in his o that way in Whic it Was Once efore suspende by the spiriis drive in his o that way the sat gland wil propeland determine the sat animal spiriis in the fame Wayas the were efore drive by a simila suspensionis the litti gland He held, moreover, that each volitiono the in is unite by nature to a certain definit emotionis the gland For example, Pone Will to 6hupo a distant objeci, his volition causes a dilatationos the pupil; ut fine thin oni o dilating the pu-pit, it is os noras to have the Will o do this, formature

166쪽

has nolcioine Mith the mill to dilate or contraci thepupi that motionis the gland that serves to impet thespirit toWard the optic nerve in the proper a forditat in or contracting the pupil but has oine thisoni With the will to look upon distanti near objecis. Finat lyrae held that, although each motion of this lit-lle gland seem to have been Oine by nature it a single ne os ou thoughis rom the eginning ofou life yet these motions an ecioine with other

thought as a result o custom. his e trie toprove in Art. 5o,iari I, of the ' Passion of the Soul. 'From these consideration si infers there is no foui soseebl that it cannot. When et directed acquire an absolute poWer ver iis passions Theserare, as he has define them, perceptions o sensations origisations of

the ouc referreae imis specialθ, and produceae, steri us, and infensi eae, Θ some motis of the spirus see AH. 7, Partes, of the Passion o Me GuIV). ut seeing that e re able torioin illi an volitio an motiono the gland an consequently of the spiriis, and that the determinatio of the wili is in ur Wn poWer, itfollows that, i me determine u volitio by definite an steadfas decisions accordin t whicli, wis todirect the actions of u life and join to these decision the motions of the passion we Wis to have, eshal acquire an absolute Controi ver ou passions.

doctrine of that mos illustrious man- doctrine Ishould scarce have belleve put forward by suc aman, hasit been es acute. Indeed, I cannot suffciently onder that a philosopher, ho ad firmiydetermine to infer nothin excepi from self-evident principies, an to amrm nothing ut hat he clearly an distincti perceived, and who so osten lamed

167쪽

the scholastic for Wishingo explain obscure things by occult qualities, hould assume a hypothesis more occuli than an occult quality. What, I ask doeshe mean by the unionis min and bod What clear an distinc conception has he, I say, of thought most closely unite to a certain mali portioni extension

quantitas i ould that he had explaine this unionb iis proximate cause But he had conceived them in aso such a degre distinc from heiod thath Was nable to assign an particular cause either of this union oris the minxiiself, but a compelle tofal bach upo the cause of the Whole universe that is,upo God. In the secon place, I Would vasti liketo no hoW many degrees of motion the in cancommunicate to that litile pinea gland and wit What degre os force it an hol it suspended. Fores dono know hether his gland is driveta bout by themin more lowl o more Wisti than by the animal spiriis, nor hether the motion belongin to the passions, hicli, have firmi joine to steadfas decisions may notae delache from them in turn by corporea Causes. In his case it ould follo that, although the in has forme a firm purpos ofgoinxi mee dangers, an has oine to this decision

sight of the clange the gland may be so suspendeo that the min ca thin o nothinibu night. Surely,

since there is no comparin volitio an motion thereis also no comparing the o eri force of the mindand of the ody. Consequently the force of the lat- ter anno possibi be determine by that os the former. Ad to these considerations that this gland is no found tolera siluate in the iddie of the brain that it canis drive about so asit an in s many

168쪽

Ways, an further, that nolint the nerves extensas faras the cavities of the brain. Finalty Domit ali that this Writer asseris Concerning the wit an iis freedom, as Ιhave ive suffcient an more than suffcient proos that it is false. Since, therefore, the poWer of themin is, ases have hown bove, limite solet to un- derstanding, e hali determine from theanowledge of the in dolone the remedies for the emotions- remedies of hicli, I hink, at men have experience, but whicli thendo no caresuli observe nor distinctly See-and rom the fame nowledge of the in Weshali deduce ali that concern iis tessedness.

I. I tWo contrar actions are excite in the fame subjeci, either both of themimone of them must necessarii undergo Change untii the ceas tot Contrary. a. The poweri an effect is define by the poNero iis cause, in sociar ascit essen eris explaine or define by the essen Ce oscit CauSe.

This axiom is evident rom III, 7. )PROP. I. ius as the Moughu and Me ideas of thino, are arraved and connected in the minae, o, fretasHF, aretis modi rations of the oo, o Me image of thius, arran fand connected in the boo. Proof-The orde an Connectio os ideas is thesame ΙΙ, 7 a the orde an connectio of things, an Conversely the orde an connectio of things is the fame II 6 cor. and 7 cor. has the orde an Connectio of ideas Therefore justos the orde and connectionis ideas in the in folloW the orde and

concatenatio of the modifications of theiody II, 18 ,

169쪽

so, conversely III, a), the orde an connectio of the modifications of the od follo the orde and concatenation in the in of thoughis and the ideas of things Q. E. D.

PROP. 3. An emotion Mat is a passion erases fode a passion a raon a me formis clear and distiner idea fit. Proof-An emotio that is a passion is a confused

idea genera dein, Me morions). f therefore, e formis clear an distinc idea of this emotion, his idea uillae oni logicali distinc from the emotionitself, in sociar ascit is referre to the indolone II, a I, an schol. 3. ence III, 3)f the emotion ill

170쪽

Proow-The qualities common to ali hings can

II, a, and 3, Mol. Iem a), there is no modificatio of theiod of hicli, cannot form a Clear and distinc conception Q. E. D. CorollarF.-Ηencerit follows that there is no emotiono Which, cannot forma clear an distinc Conception. For the emotion is the de of the modification

clea an distinc conception. Misolium.-Since there is nothinifrom hic some effeci oes no follo I, 363, an Since e Comprehen very clearly an distincti everything that fol-lows rom an idea that is adequat in us II, o); itfolloWs that everyone has the poweris noWinchim set an his emotion clearly an distinctly, is notwholly, at eas in pari and Consequently has thepower os makin himself les subjecto these emotions This, then, hould e the hie objec os uressoris, o no each emotion, o far a is possibie, clearly an distinctly so that the in may thus edetermine from the emotion to the thought of that Whicli it clearly an distincti perceives, and in hichil Wholi acquiesces an to the en that the emotionitself may be separate fro the thought of iis externa cause and joine to true thoughis. From his it Will result, not ni that love hate, etc., ill e e- stroyed a), ut also that the appetite o destres Whic are Won to pring rom suo emotions Cannot

SEARCH

MENU NAVIGATION