The philosophy of Spinoza as contained in the first, second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics" and in extracts from the third and fourth

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secondilace the more the min&rejoices in this divine love or tessedness, the more it knows sa); that is 3 cor.), the reater the o e it has ver the emotions and 38 the lescit is subjecto emotions thatare uriful. There ore from the fac that the indrejoices in this divine love or tessedness, it has theseo eri restraining the destres. An since the poWero man to restrai the emotion consist in under- standing alone, o ne rejoices in blessednes becauseli restrain the emotions, ut o the contrary the poWer of restraining the destres prings romitessed-

intende to ho regarding the poWer of the indove the emotions and the reedom of the mino. From hic it is evident hoW much stronge and bel- ter the wis mancis than the ignorant man who is led by mere destre For the ignorant an besides beingagitate in many Way b externa causes, an neVerattaining true satisfactio of out lives ascit ere ithout consciousnes of himself, o God, and of things, and justris soon si Ceases tote Ctedipon, ceases tote. Whil on the contrary the wis man, inso farra hecis considere a such is it difficulty disturbe in ovi, but conscious by a certain eternalnecessit of himself, o God, and of things, he neverceases tole, but is alWays possesse of true satisfactio of soul. Is incleed the path that Phave ho nto ea to this appear ver dissiculi, stili it ma besound An suret it must e dissiculi, sincerit is soraret found For i salvation ere at and and couldie found without great labor, ho could it beneglected by early veryone But ali excellent

things are a dissiculi a the are rare.

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no clear. Didie understand it a something distinctfrom and underlyiniit attributes, o simplyrus a namefo the sum os the attribute. Both vieWs have beenhel by his critics, an passages may be adduce in favor of each. The definitionis attribute that whic the intellectierceives of substance, as Constitutiniit essence,' and suc passages a that in the proosos prop. Io, Which mahes an attribute, lihe a substance, tot conceived through itself, ould seem to indicate that there is no reat difference belween substance andattributes o the ther and the language of the First ar of the Ethic meet iis natural interpretationoni o the assumptio that the author regarde substance an attributes a distinc things-taking this Wor in iis broad sense. ad Spinoga been Clearly conscious thati substanc he meant only the sum os the attributes, it Would have been ver eas fortim tohave sal so, an he might have avoide aureat dealo reasoning that on this supposition appears to be mere

the Selections of the ources of the Spinogistic philosophy, shouldie borne in mino. Perhaps the best explanatio of the inconsistenc in Spinoga's language, an presumabini his thought,dies in assuming that heretain the Neo-Ρlatoni conceptio of the ne, as Be-ing Without distinctions and et reason asci the ne Were simply the sum totalis existin things.

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2. p. 3o Al three of the proof of the necessary

I the word beoahen a meret indicatin that nocauseris to e ought for the argumen is destroyed see prore os prop. 7). Furthermore, it cloes no solioWthat ecause a thing cannoti produce by somethingelse, it musti produce by tself. It is possibi that

it o n cause, the existence of substance is no proved by this argument, an prop. 7 hould o be sed in proo os prop. II. The secon proos, hic ista in severat respecis,ma be condemne meret o the ground that it resison the genera statemen that a thin must exist ftherei no cause Whicli prevenis iis existence. veni π admit the positive statemen that verythingilia exist mus have ome cause, e remo boundio admit the negative statemen that there must e causerior the non-existence of Whateve does no exist. Stricti speahing one cannot say that there must e cause for the non-existence of things for this has noreataeing, and Cannoti an esseCt, . . ., annot tandi a certain relation to nother thing. When e say, as e somelimes do that a thin cloes no exist hecauseth system of things is lia it is, eini mea that there cloes no exist a suilabi causerior the production

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I9 CRITICAL NOTES. PAGE 3o of the thing in question. e cannot mean to causali relate the non-existence of the thingeto a parti the wholeo the system of things. The doctrine that there mustbe a cause for the non- existence of verything that cloes no exist Would have strange Consequences Letus suppos nothing at altrio exist a conception possi-ble nough : oui it the follo that there mustexis causes of at this non-existenc os thingsyΤhe thir proo is also defective. he premisesupon hic it est shoul not have been assume assetf-evident. The statemen that the potentialit os non-existenc is lacco powerris, interprete in thesens made necessar by the argument uili pon it, evidenti false. I a thin cloes no exist one annot say that it has the poWer nota exist, or has anythingelse. he proo compares the poWeri an existingsinite eing Wit that os a non-existent infinite being, an declares that in ossa a the infinite bein is non- existent it is les powerfui. No it is possibierio compare the properties of an existent thing it thos ofa non-existent, is e abstraci rom the existence and non- existenCe. In Such a Comparison, say, in effeci,

that, di both of the things exist one Would stan insuch and such relation to the other. ut ii the exist-

ence an non-existence enter in to the comparison and

cannot be abstracte from, the matter is very different. thing cannot be lessio ersul than another in that itis non-existent for in that it is non-existent it cannotenter into any comparison at ali A non- existent thingcannotae infinite, o strong, or eah, o anything else, forcit is nothing he argument, therefore, fatis. The proo that Godis substanc consist in infinite attribute is more expliciti brought out in the scholium. As potentialit os existenc is a poWer, it fol-

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lows that the more reality i. e. the greater the numbero attributes, se prop. 9hbelong to the nature flathing the more powerrit has to exist. ence an abSO- lutet infinite eing i. e. one it infinite attributes,see def. 6 has an absolutely infinite poWer of existing theresoreae absolutet exi sis of Course this reasoning falis illi the precedin arguments for even i potentialit os existence e properi calle a poWer, itca certaint not be possesse or exercised by omething that cloes no exist, and the whole question is Whether thes in t Which, are attributin a ivennature cloes exist o not, and ence Whether it canliave any ower halever. f the bein cloes no exist non of the attributes, allo to tisan exist nor Can the number of these non-existent attributes beany

indicationis a realio e to existis the par of thebeing in question. 3 p. 46. Μodes are particula things. Materialthings are modes of the attribute of extension, and ideas are modes of the attributei thought. An portio of

the content of a single attribute, or even the hole, may be regarde asine thing, and so alien a a mode.

Spinoeta ives elsewhere Lette 64, ed. an loten an Land), as instances os infinite modes immediatelyproduce by God motion, hichae regarde a a realthingis constant quantity, and absolutely infinite un-clerstanding. V The face of the whole universe V hecites as an instance of an infinite mode mediatet produce by God. The doctrine of the infinite modes playsmo important par in his system.

4. p. 49. At finite modes that is, ali individualthings in the worid Spinoeta regarded a conditioned by other finite things, thesei stillisthers, an sorio infinity. The chain os finite causes is theresore endless, and

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one cannot at an potnt leave it an reser o God asthe cause of an finite thing, asine refers to one finitething a cause of another. It is the fame ith the infinite modes of the previous note. The cannot enter into the causa nexus at an potnt. The statement, then that God is the efiicient cause of things prop. as must e taken in ome sense qui te distinc fromthat suggeste by the common meaning of the Word S. What that senseris, is no clear. I We ah the word Godrio mea simply the sum totalis existing things se nouo, bove), e ma interpret prop. a nega livet a signifying only that no explanation o anythiniis tome ooked formulside of the universe a a Whole. his, hoWever, is hymo means a natura interpretationis Spinoga's language.

6. p. 74. Ιt illae remembere that Spinoeta re-garde ever finite mode a conditione by an endlessseries os finite causes Ι,4 83. NoW the modes fine attribute cannot condition those os another II 63. achattributeris, therefore, modified by an infinit o finite

modes causali connecte With ne nother, but hav- in no causal connection ith the modes of an other attribute. Nevertheless, the modes in ac attribute absolutet correspond with the modes in very therattribute for substance, hether contemplate under the attributei thought, o thatis extension or underan other, sine and the fame thing. ac mode inone attribute must, heresore, have a Correspondingmode in every other attribute, hicli moderis impi a different Way of expressing the fame thing Thus ehave in the attributei extensio an infinite series of materia things connecte With each ther in a necessar an fixe ordera an in the attributei thought an infinite series of ideas also connecte With ach

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PAGM 4 CRITICAL NOTEs. 193other in fixe order For every materia thin thereis a Correspondin mode in the attributei thought,

and this is the de of the thing. A materia thingansit idea are ne and the fame thin unde tW aSpecis They are also the fame With ac correspond- in mode in the ther attributes os substance. The bove illustration of the correspondence of modes becomes Cleare Whe we remember that Spi-noga regarde ali natur as animates II, 3, MOL) In the words, e belleve that ac materia thinghas an actuali existing counterpar in thought Whichma properi be calle iis idea. In this sense of the word, the human minoris the de of the humanaody II, 133. The doctrine of the infinite number of the attributes of substance, and of the Correspondenc os the modes in these, is o litile significance in Spinoeta's philosophy, since themature os these attributes is un-known. What is important is the attempto bridgetheaul bet Nee thought an extension.

Spinoeta' proo that there is no causa ConnectionbetWeen the modes of ne attribute and thos o another ill not ea critica examination se II, 6, and the referenus hic suppora it). t a naturat, hoWever, that he hould have dente thei inter- action. Descartes ad so separate though and extensio in his philosophyrus to mali almos inevitabi the doctrinem occasional Causes, hic aroseamon his immediate followers. his doctrine held that God is the immediate cause of menta changes

Whicli appea to result rom materia causes, and of materia changes hic appea to resul from mental Causes. What appears o us the cause is ni theoccasio sor the exercise of God' action. his constant interferenc on the partis an externa cause

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Spinoga could not admit, scit is holi opposed totis notion os the Divine immanence in things It was, there fore, necessar for im to den that thought canac um extension or extension pon thought. Itre maine fortim to in som explanatio of the fact whic it neve seem to have occurred to him to question that though and things area relate a to mahea knowledge of things possibie. The forma proo of the statemen that the orderand connectionis ideas is the fame a the orcle and

effect depend onanowledge of iis cause an involvesit. The expressions 4noWledge os an effect V and V knowledge of iis cause V assume tinc the Correspondence of the knowledge' and the effect V in the one case, and of the cinowledge V and the cause in the ther A the ord cause' and effect assume the materia things in question tot in a certain definite relation itini remains for the axiom to declare the fame relation to hol good et een the intellectual factorS. The explanatio of the correspondence of modeswhic appear in the scholium is quite in harmonyWith much that is current in the present day It is no uncommon to ear in and alter spolieni astwo aspecis faces V of the fame hing. Suchepitheis a describe, but the in no is explain, thei relation. What is sal in the scholium cannot be regarde a proo of the correspondence, for the

veale in both the thin and the de of the thingie

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PAGE 7M CRITICA NOTES. 19ssomething different rom both, proo fhouldie offered i that substanc exist a that the substance under-lying the two modes is reatly identices, and 3 that a

single substanc underlying tW modes ould Causesuch a parallelismi modes a the ne in question. The proos of the existenc os substance have atready been discussed nos a). The secon mini Spinoetad aes no prove in an sense that could serve the de- sire end. e has argued that substance is indivisibie I, 2, 3). The substanc underlying one mode is, theresore, identica with the substanc underlying any other mode. Is then, e argue that a thin is ne and the fame With the de of that thing on theground that the are ni different expression of the Same substance, e may also argue that a thiniis onean the fame With the idea os an other thing. Anyattempto prove the correspondenc os modes romidentit os underlying substance must assume that thesubstanc underlying each materia thin is distinctfrom that underlyin every other materia thing, andis identica wit that underlying one particula idea. Such a partitioni substanc Spinoet could not admit. A to the thir potnt, is it is no incompatil,lewith the unit os the one substanc that it should have two such different manifestations a thought an extension, What reason is there to thin it incompatiblewith iis unit that the orde an arran gementis paris in the two manifestations shout be different λΙs, understand by substanc meret the sum ofthe attributes se nos i), We have in this scholium noexplanatio at ali os the corresponden ce of modes. Οur calling two distinc thing the fame hin Will notmahe them correspondono Caesit furnis an evidencethat the do correspond.

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timatel certain, ha thought it necessar to prove theexistence of the ody, and sho that thought is notshut up holi Within iis . sphere. e findiso simila attempto prove an externat ori in Spi-nOZa. e assumes a needin no proof the existenceboth os deas an materia things, and the fac that there is knowledge os materia things see the criticismo I axiom 4, in muri). et his te of the naturalindependence of thought and things lend nemvitalityto the artesian doubi hether the thing that ideas are suppose to represent reali do exist. Apropos of the relation etween in and Ody, a serious dissiculi connecte Wit Spinoeta's doctrine of the correspondence of modes in the infinite attributes, and of thei identit in the ne substance, Wascleari potntediuti a contemporary, fChirnhausen, in a lette to the philosopher Duer 653. The doctrine maintain that ac individua thin is expresse in an infinit o modes. The thin Whicli, in the attributei thought is calle the human mino, is in the