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universe : whicli nature he supposed to be an aetherial body, the seed of the generation of ali things. Plato held fate to be the eternat reason orlaw of nature. Chrysippus supposed that fate was a spiritual powerwhicli dispo sed the worid in order ; that it was the reason and law of those things whicli are administered by providen ce. et et. All the forego ing notions os fate, as represented by Plutarch, do plainly meis that those ancient philosophers did not mean by fate, ablind, head-long, ura intelligent principie, but an orderly se illed cour se of things conducted by a wi se and provident mind. And as sor the AEgyp ti an doctrine, it is in deed asserted in the Pimander, that ali things are produced by late. But Jamblichus, who dreru his notions fio m AEgyyt, affirms that the whole of things is not bound up in late ; but that thereis a principi e of the foui higher than nature, where by we may be rai sedio an union with the Gods and exempt ourselves Dom fate. And in the Asclepian dialogue it is expresty se id that fate follo S the decrees of God. And in deed, as ali the motions in nature are evidently the product of reason it mould stem there is no room sor necessi ty, in any other sensethan that os a Ready regular course. et 3. Blind sate and blind chance a re at bottona much the same thing,
and one no more intelligible than the other. Such is the mutuat relation, connection, motion, and sympathy of the paris of this Worid, that theystem as it were animaled and held together by one foui: and sicli istheir harmony, order, and regular course, as me cili the Qui to be go-verne d and directed by a mind. It was an opinion os remote antiqui tythat the world was an animal l. Is we may trust the Hermaic writ ings,
the AEgyptians thought ali things did parta ke of lise. This opinion was
also so generat and current among the Greelis, that Plutarch asseris allothers held the worid to be an animal, and go verned by provide iace, eX-
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cept Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal, containing ali hodies with in iiself, could not be to uched or sensi bly assected stom Without , yet it is plain they attributed to it an inward sense and seeling, as Heli as appetites and aversions; and that Dom ali the variousiones, actions and pastions of the universe, they supposed one symphony,one animal aes and lise to result. 274. Jamblicus declares the worid to be one animal, in Whicli theparis howe ver distant Dom each other, are ne verthelesi related and co nected by one common nature. And he teacheth, What is also a received notion of the Pythagoreans and Platonics that there is no chasmin nature, but a cha in or scale of ings rising by gentie uninterrupted gradations fioni the lowest to the highest, each nature being informedand persected by the participation os a lii Oer. As air hecomes igneous,so the purest fire becomes animal, and the animal Qui hecomes intellectual, whicli is to he understood not of the change of one nature intoanother, but of the connection os dis rent natures, each lower naturebeing, according to those philosophers, as it Were a recepta cle or subjectfor the nexi above it to reside and act in.
27s. It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that intellect is the very li se of living things, the first principie and exemplar of ali, Domwhence by dif&rent degrees are derived the inserior classes of lise, fit stthe rationat, then the sensitive, after that the vegetat, but so as in therationat animal there is stili semewhat intellectuat, again in the sensitivethere is semewhat rational, and in the vegetat so me hat sensitive, and lastly in mixt bodies as metals and minerais, se me hat of vegetation. By whicli means the whole is thought to be more persectly connected. Whicli doctrine impli es that ali the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their severat respective subordinations, are derived from and depend upon mind and intellect.
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a 6. Both Stoics and Platonics held the worid to be alive, though metimes it be mentioned as a sentient animal, semetimes as a plant orvegetabie. But in this, notwithstanding What hath been surmised bysome learned men, there seems to be no atheisin. For se long as themorid is supposed to be qui chened by elementary fire or spirit, whicli isitself animaled by Qui, and directed by understanding, it sollows thatali paris thereos originalty depend upon, and may be reduced unio, thesa me indivisibie stem or principie, to wit, a supreme mind ; whicli is theconcurrent doctrine of Pythagoraeans, Platonios, and Stoics. 27 . There is, according to those philosophers, a lise in sed throughout
ward principie, animal spirit, or natural lik producing and Orming with- in as art doth without, regulat in g, moderat ing, and reconciling the various motions, qualities and paris of this mundane system. By virtve of this life the great masses a re held together in their ordinary courses, asweli as the minutest particles governed in their natural motions, accord- ing to the severat laws os attraction, gravi ty, electrici ty, magnetita, and the rest. It is this gives instincis, teaches the spider her web, and thehee her honey. This it is that directi the roots of planis to dra in fortiij uices Dom the ear th, and the leaves and corticle vesseis to separate andattract sucii particles of air, and elementary fire, as fuit their respective
2 8 Nature seems to be not other ise distingui med Dom the imarmundi, than a s life is Dom foul, and upon the principies of the oldest philosophers, may not improperly or incongruously be styled the li se of the worid. Some Platoni cs in deed, regard liis as the adt of nature, in illic manner as intellection is of the mind or intellest. As the sirst intellect acts by understandingi se nature according to them acis Or generateS
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uni ty to the infinite aggregate of things, by a mutuat communion of actions and passions, and an adjustinent of paris, causing ali to concurin one vi e to one and the same en d, the ultimate and supreme good of
the whole, it should stem rea nable to say, with Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, that a s life holds together the hodies of animais, the causewhereos is the foui; and as a city is held together by concord, the causewhereos is laN; even so the worid is held together by harmony, thecause whereos is God. And in this sense, the worid or universe may be
conssidered ei ther as one animal ' or One city.
28 o. Aristolle di sapproves the opinion of those who hold a Qui to bedi Tu sed throughout the worid , and for this reason; because the elements are not alive. Though perhaps it may not be east to prove, that blood and animal spirit a re more alive in man, than water and si re in the worid. That philosopher, in his books of the foui, rem artis tapon an opinion set sortii in the Orphics, of the foui's entering from the universe into living creatures heing borne by winds, that this cannot be true os planis Or Os certa in animal s whicli do not breathe. But air vesseis a re bylater experiments allowed to be found in ali planis and animal s. And air may in seme fori not improperly be se id, to be the carrier or vehicle of theso ut, inasmuch as it is the vehicle of fire, whicli is the spirit immediately moved and animaled by the sotii l.
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other expressons of the like nature occurring in the ancient and Platonicphilosophy, how can they be understood exclusive of light or elementalfire, the particles of whicli are linown to be heterogeneous, and , forought we know, may so me of them be organi Zed, and , not illis and ingtheir wonderfui minute ness, contain original seeds Whicli, being formedand sowed in a proper matrix, do gradu atly un id and manifest them-selves, stili gro ing to a just proportion of the species. 282. May not this aethereat seminary consistently with the notions of that philosophy, whicli ascribed much of generation to celestiat influence, be suppo sed to impregnate planis and animais With the sirst principies, the stamina, or those animalcules whicli Plato, in his Timaeus, Aith are invisibi e sor their smaliness, hui, being sown in a proper matrix, aretherein gradu atly distended and explicated by nourishment, and at lengththe animais brought sortii to light. Whicli notion hath been revived and received os late years by many, who perhaps are not a a re os iis antiqui ty. or that it was to be sound in Plato. Timaeus Locrensiis, in hisbook of the so ut of the worid, supposeth even Quis to be derived Domthe celestiat luminaries, cxcepting only the rational or intellectual pari. But what influence or influx is there stom the celestial bodies, which hallinoi light for iis vehicle t283. What other nature there mould be intermediate bet ween the ut of the worid ' and this grossi corporeat system, Whicli might be thevehicle of liis, or, to use the langu age of philosophers, might receive orbe impressed with the forms of things, is dissiculi to comprehend. It is a vulgar remarii, that the works of ari do not bear a nice microscopiat inspection, but the more hel ps a re u sed, and the more ni cely you pryinto natural productions, the more do you discover of the fine mechani
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of nature, whicli is endlesi or inexhausti ble; neW and other paris, more subtile and delicate than the precedent, stili continuing to offer them-selves to vlew. And these micro optat observations have confirmed the ancient theory concerning generation, deli vered in the Timaeus of Plato. But that theory or hypothesis, how agreeable Qever to modern discoveri es, is not alone sufficient to explain the phaenomena, without the immediate action of a mind. And Ficinus, notwithstanding what he himself and other Platonics say of a plastic nature, is obliged to own, that with the munda ne force or Qui it is to be understood, there is joined an intelligenee, upon whicli the seminal nature constantly depends, and by whicli it is governed. 28 . Alcinous in his traft of the doctrine os Plato salth that God hathgi ven the world both mind and foui: others include both in the word Qui, and suppo se the Qui of the worid to be God. Philo appears to beos this opinion in severat paris of his writ ings. And Virgil, who was no stranger to the Pythagorean and Platonio tenets writes to the fame
Purpose. Deum namque ire per omnes Terras que tractusque maris coelumque profundum. Hinc pecudes armenta, Uiros, genus omne ferarum Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere Titas.
Thus much the schools of Plato and Pythagoras seem agreed in, to wit, that the Qui of the world whether having a distinct mind of iis own, or directed by a superior mindi, dotii embrace ali iis paris, connect them by an invisibie and indissolubie chain, and preserve them ever weli ad-justed and in good order.
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et 8s. Naturalists, whose proper province it is to consister phaenomena, experimenis, mechanicat organs and motions, principalty regard the visi-ble frame of things or corporeat worid, suppossing Qui to be containedin body. And this hypothesis may be tolerated in physios, as it is notnecessary in the art of dyalling or navigation to mention the true systemor earlli's motion. But those who, not conterat with sensibie appearances, mould penetrate into the real and true causes the object of theology, metaphystios, or the philosophia prima) will rectist this error, and speak of the
worid as contained by the foui, and not the Qui by the worid. 286. Aristolle hath observed there were indeed some who thought so grossy, as to suppose the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature: but in the first book of his metaphysics he justly rem arks theywere guilty of a great mistake; sorasmuch as they took in to their account
the elements of corporeal beings alone ; Whereas there are incorporealbeings also in the universe ; and while they attempt to assign the causes of generation and corruption, and account for the nature os ali things, they did at the same time destroy the very cause of motion. 28 . It is a doctrine among other speculations contained in the Hermaic writings, that ali things are one. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, and others among the Greelis, might have derived their notion of G ΤΗΕ ONE Dom AEgypt. Though that subtile meta- physician Parmenides, in his doctrine os o seems to have added semething of his o n. Is we suppose, that one and the fame mind is the universat principie of order and harmony throughout the worid, containing and connecting ali iis paris, and giving uni ty to the system, therestems to he nothing atheistical or implous in this supposition. 288. Number is no object of sense : it is an act of the mirad. Thesam e thing in a different conception is one or many. Comprehending
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God and the creatures in one generat notion, We may say that ali things
respectial, and consequently the truer notion of God, to suppose hi mnelther made up of paris, nor to be himself a part of any whole What-
289. All those, who conceived the universe to be an animal, must in consequence of that notion, suppose ali things to he one. But to conceive God to be the sentient Qui os an animal, is altogether un orthyand absurd. There is no sense, nor sensory, nor any thing like a senseor sensory in God. Sense implies an impression stom me other beinnand denotes a dependence in the fout which hath it. Sense is a passion: and pamions imply imperfection. God knoweth ait things, as pure mindor intellect, but nothing by sense, nor in nor through a sensory. There- fore to suppose a sensery of any kind, whether space or any other in Godwould be very wrong, and lead us into false conceptions of his nature. The presum ing there was such a thing as real absolute uncreated space, stems to have occasioned that modera mistahe. But this presumptionwas Without groundS. etso. Body is opposite to spirit or mind. We have a notion os spiritfrom thought and action. We have a notion of body from resistance. So far sortii as there is real po er, there is spirit. So far sortii as thereis resistance, there is inabili ty or want of power: that is, there is a negation os spirit. We are embodi ed, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by ressistance. But in respect of a perfect spirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrabie: there is no resistance to the deity : nor
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Qui os an animal is to iis body, whicli necessarily implieth desect, bothas an instrument and as a constant Neight and impediment. 29 I. Thus much it consists with piety to say, that a divine agent dothby his virtve permeate and go vern the elementary fire or light whichserves as animal spirit to enti ven and actua te the whole mast, and ali themembers of this visibie worid. Nor is this doctrine lesi philosophi calthan pious. We see ali nature alive or in motion. We see water turn ed into air, and air rarested and made elastic ' by the attraction of another medium, more pure indeed, more subtile and more volatile than a tr. But stili, as this is a moveable extended, and consequently, a corporealbe in g, : it cannot be it self the principat os motion, but leads us natural lyand necessari ly to an incorporeat spirit or agent. We are conscious thata spirit can begin, alter, or determinate motion, but nothing of this appears in body. Fay, the contrary is evident, both to experiment and reflection. 292. Natural phaenomena a re only natural appea rances. Τhey are, therei ore, lach as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, theres re, the fame; passive Without any thing active, fluentand changing without any thing permanent in them. HOWeVer, as thesema ke the first impressions, and the mind talies her first night and si ring as it were, by resting her ot on these objects, they a re not only firct considered by ali men, hut most considered by most men. They and thephantom S that result shom tho se appea rances, the child ren os imaginationgrasted upon sense, such for example as pure space S are thought bymany the very first in existende and stabili ty, and to embrace and comprehend ali other heings.
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293. NON although lach phantoms as corporeat sorces, absolute motioris, and real spaces, do past in physics for causes and principies , yetare they in truth but hypotheses, nor can they be the objects of reat science. They pasi neverthelesse in Physics conversant abo ut things of sense, and confined to experiments and mechanica. But When we enter the province of the philosophia prima, We disco ver another order of beings, minii and iis adis, permanent being, not dependent ora corporeat things, nor resulting, nor connected, nor contained ; but containing, connecting, enti ven ing the whole frame; and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and symmetry to ali those transient phaenomena, Whichwe term the course of nature.
29 . It is with our faculties as with our assections: what first stiges holds fast l. It is a vulgar theme, that man is a compo und of contrarieties, which breed a resilest struggle in his nature, between fessi and spirit, the beasi and the anget, ear th and heaven, e ver eighed down ande ver bearing up. During whicli considi the character fluctuates: whenei ther si de prevatis, it is then fixed sor vice or virtve. Anil life Domdi fierent principies tahes a disserent issue. It is the fame in regard toour faculties. Sense at first heseis and overbears the mind. The sensi-ble appearances are ali in ali: our rea nings are employed a boui them: our destres terminate in them: we look no farther for realities or causes;
illi intellect begiris to dawn, and cast a ray on this smadowy scene. Wothen pereeive the true principie of uni ty, identity, and existence. Those things that he re see med to constitute the whole of be in g, upon taliing an intellectual vie π of things, prove to be but fleeting