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habita os an older date than et ther judgment or opinion. Through lacha medium the mari est eye cannot see clearly . And is by me extraordinary essori the minil mould surmount this du&y region, and malcha glimpse os puro light, me is seon drawn backward and depressed by the hea vinest of the animal nature, to which she is chain ed. And is again me chancelli, amidst the agitation of wild sancies and strong assections, to spring up ards, a second relapse speedily succeeds into this region os darknesi and dream S. 3 I. Nevertheless, as the mind gathers strength by repea ted afls, wemouid not despond, but continue to exert the prime and flower of our faculties, stili reco vering, and reaching on, and struggling in to the Upperregi On, Whereby our natural wealine se and bliiadnest may be in sonae de-gree remedied, and a taste attained of truth and intellectual lise. Beside the constant prevalling opinion of the greatest men os antiqui ty, that there is both an universat spirit author os life and motion, and an uni versat mind enlighte ning and ordering ali things, it was a received tenetamong them, that there is also ri ἔ, or . ', whicli they looked on asthe fons deitatis, the first hypostasis in the divinity.
3 2. The one or 76 heing immutabie and indivisibic, always the fame and entire, was there re thought to exist truly and originalty, and Other things only so far as they a re one and the fame, by participation of ῖν. This gives uni ty, stabili ty, reali ty to things Plato describes God, as Moses, fio in his bellig. According to both, God is he who trulyiS, ..Hώπων. Change and division were essee med desedis or bad. Evilscatters, divides, destroys. Good, on the contrary, produceth concord and union, assem bies, combines, persedis, and preserves entire. The severatheings whicli compose the universe a re paris of the same system, theycombine to carry on one en d, and perfeci one whole. And this apiness
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siris. and concurrence thereunto furnimes the partiat particular idea os good in the distinct creatures. Hence it might have come to past, that τ ανα and
τι o Nere regarded as one and the fame.3 s. Light and sight illi Plato in the si xth book of his republic) arenot the lan: even se truth and knowledge are not the good it self, although they approach thereunto. And again, what the sun is in a visibie place with respect to sight and things seen, that fame is i or good in an intelligibie place, with respect to understanding and things understood. The resore the good or one is not the light that enlightens, but the urce
of that light.3 Every moment produceth some change In the paris of this visibie
creation. Something is added or diminimed, or altered in essen ce, quantity, quali ty, or habitude. Wher ore ali generaled heings were seid by the ancients to be in a perpetuat flux '. And that whicli, on a confusedand generat vieis, seems one single constant bei nn mali upon a ne arer inspection appear a continued series of disserent heings. But God rema inssor e ver one and the same. There re God alone exist s. This was thedoctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, and other ancient S. 3 s. It is the opinion os Plato and his sollowers, that in the Qui ofman, prior and superior to intelleci, there is somewhat of an higher nature, by virtve of which we are one'; and that by means of our one or Unite, we are most closely joined to the deity. And, as by our intellectwe touch the divine intellest, even se by our ri is or unite the very fio eros our essence, as Proclus expresseth ii, we touch the first one. 3 6. According to the Platonic philosophy, ens and untun are the fame. And consequently our miniis participate so far of existence as they do of
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so ut or mind, whicli is a monvi se far sortii as siue is a person. There- fore person is reatly that whicli exilis, inasmuch as it participales the di-Vine uni ty. In man the monad or indivisibie is the istis. Q. αυj. the selffame self or very self, a thing in the opinion of Socrates, much and nar-rowly to be inquire t into and discussed, to the end that, lino Ning our-selves, we may know What belonga to us and our happinesse. 3 7. Upon mature reflexion the person or mind, of ali created heings,seemeth alone indivisi1ble, and to partake most of uni ty. But sensi blethings are rather considered as one than truly so, they being in a perpetuat flux or succession, e ver dissering and various. Neverthelest ali thingstogether may be considered as one universe ', one by the Connexion, relation, and order of iis paris, whicli is the work of mind, whose unite is
by Platonics, supposed a participation of the firB G ἔν.3 8. Socrates, in the Theaetetus of Plato, speaheth of two parties
who held ali things to he in a perpetuat flux, alWays a generat ingand ne ver existing; and those others who maintained the universe to bofixed and immoveable. The difference seems to have been this, that Heraclitus, Protagoras, Empedocles, and in generat those of the formersect, considered things sensibie and natural ; whereas Parmenides and his Party considered vi not as the sensibi e but as the intelligibie world f, abstracted stom ali sensi ble things.s 9. In effect, is we mean by things the sensibie objects ι these, it is evident, a re always so ing; but is we mean things purely intelligibie, then we may say on the other hand, with equat truth, that they a re immoveable and unchangeable. So that those, who thought the whole or
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whole of reat heings, whicli in their sense was only the intellectuat worid, not allowing reali ty of being to things not permanent. sso. The displealare of seme readers may perhaps be incurred, bystri rising them into certain reflexions and inquiries sor whicli they have no curiosi ty. But perhaps me others may be pleased, to find a drysu est varied by digressions, traced through remote inserences, and carried into ancient times, whose hoary maxim S scat tered in this esiay arenot proposed as principies, but barely as hinis to a alien and exercise the inquisitive reader, on potnis not beneath the attention of the ablest men. Those great men, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristolle, the most consummate in polities, who unded states, or instructed princes, or wrotemost accurately on public go vern ment, were at the se me time most acuteat ali abstracted and sublime speculations; the clearest light being evernecessary to guide the most important actions. And whate ver theworid thinlis, he who hath not much medita ted upon God, the humanmirid, and the summum bonum, may possibiy malle a thri ving earth-worm, hut wili most indubitably malle a sorry patriot and a serry
3s I. According to the nice metaphysics of tho se ancient philosophersbeing considered as what was first and simplest in the deity, was prescinded even Dorn entity to whicli it Was thought prior and superior; and is there re by the Platonics styled superestentiat. An d in the Parmenides it is se id, j. D doth not exist ; whicli might scem to imply a negation of the divine heing. Τhe truth is, Zeno and Parmenides argued, that a thing existing in time was older and yo unger than it self; ther
fore the constant immutabie ri A did not exist in time; and is not in time, then in none of the dissere iaces of time past, present, Or to come; there
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Siris. 62 Isore Ne cannot say that it was, is, or Will be. But ne verthelest it is admitted in the same Parmenides, that ri νῖν is every where present tot. δ ; that is, instead os a temporary succession of momenis, there is onoeternat no , or, punctumstans, as it is termed by the schoolmen.
3sa. The simplici ty os ri o the fallier in the Pythagoric and Platonictrini ty) is conceived such as to exclude intelle 2 or mirid, to whicli it is supposed prior. And that halli created a suspicion os atheita in this opinion. For stilli the learn cd doctor CudGorth, shall we say that thefirst hypostasis or person is and sensetest and irrational, and altogether devo id of mind and understanding ξ or would not this be tointroduce a Lind of mysterious atheisin t To whicli it may be an Mered, that whoe ver acknowledgeth the universe to be made and governed by an eternat mitid, cannot be justly dee med an atheist Arad this was the tenet of tho se ancient philosophers. In the Platonic doctrine, the
porary, but frona evertasting. There ne ver Was a time supposed wherein V. i, subsisted without intelleo , the priori ty having been understo od on lyas a priori ty of order or conception, but not a priori ty of age. Thereia fore, the maintaining a distinction os priori ty tween ri is and νιλ dothinoi inser, that the one e ver existed without the other. It sollows, there- re, that the fallier or H D may, in a certa in sense, be seid to hewithout atheita, or without destroying the notion of a dei ty ; any morethan it would destroy the notion of a human ut, is we mouid conceive a distinction belween self and intellest, or intellect and lise. Towhich we may farther add, that it is a doctrine of Platonios, and agrees with their master's tenets, to say that iis is or the firsi hypothesiis containsali excellen ce and perfection whereos it is the originat s urce, and is more eminent, as the schoois speah, intelles' and lik, as weli as goodnessiwhile the second hypostasis is essentialty intellect, and by participation
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good ne si and lik; and the third, lise essentially, and by participationgoodnesi and intellect. 353. Thercsore, the whole being considered, it will not stem just, tofix the imputation os athe ita upon those philosophers, who held the
doctrine of ri ἐ.; whether it be talien in an abstracted or collective, a rne- taphysical or merely vulgar, mea ning ' ; that is, whether we prescindunt ty froni esse nce and intelleci, since metaphysical distinctions of the divine attributes do not in reali ty divide them ; or whether we considerthe universat system of beings as One, since the Union, connexion, and order of iis members, do manifestly infer a mind or intellect to be causothereos 3s . The one or G ἔν may be conceived ei ther by composition or division. For as, ora the one haud, we may say the worid or universe iso ΝΕ whole or o NE animal ; so we may, on the other hand , consider ri Aby division or abstraction, as semewhat in the order of things prior tomind. In ei ther sense there is no atheism, se long as mirad is admittedio preside and direct the animal; and so long ag the unum or ri L is suppo sed not to exist without mind '. So that nei ther Heraclitus nor Parmenides, nor Pythagoras nor Plato, net ther the AEgyptians nor Stoics, with their doctrine, of a divine whole or animal, nor Xenophanes with
ita, be it of Hobbes, Spinosa, Collins, or whom you will, is not to becounte nanced by the learning and great nam es of antiqui ty.sss Plato teacheth, that the doctrine concerning the one or unite isa means, to lead and raise the mind t to the knowledge of hirn who tria lyis. And it is a tenet both of Aristolle and Plato, that identy is a certa in
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uni ty. The Pythagoreans also, as weli as the Platonic philosophers, held unisu and ens to be the sanae. Consistently with whicli, that onyycan be se id to egist, whicli is one and the same. In things sensii ble and imaginable, as such, there stems to be no uni ty, nothin g, that may hecalled one prior to ali act of the min d; si nce they being in themselves aggregates, consisting of paris or compounded of elemenis, are in effect many. Accordingly it is remarhed by Themistius, the learned in te
preter of Aristolle, that to collect many notions into one, and to considenthem as one, is the work of intellectand not of sense or lancy.
556. Aristolle himself, in his third book of the se ut, si illi it is tho
this is done, Themistius is more particular, observing, that as being conferrem es ence, the misad by virtve of her simplici ty conferrem simplici tyupon Compounded beings. And, indeed, it seemeth that the mind, solar sorti, as person, is individual ', there in resembling the divine orie hyparticipation, and imparting to other things what itself participales Doma bove. I his is agreeable to the doctrine of the ancients, howe ver thecontrary opinion os supposing number to be an original primary quali tyin mings, independent of the mind, may obtain among the moderns. 337. The Peripatetics taught, that in ali divisible things there was somowhat indivisibie, and in ali compounded things semewhat simple. This they derived Dom an act of the mind. And net ther this simple
indivisit hie unite, nor any sum os repeated unites, Consequently nonum-her can be separat ed hom the si ings themselves and Dom the operationos the mind. Themistius goeth so far as to assirm, that it cannot besepara ted from the words or signs; and , as it cannot be utiered without them, so senti he, netther can it be conceived without them. Thus
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siritamuch upon the whole may be concluded, that distinet stom the mind and her operations, there is in created beings neither Unite nor number.
simple and undivided esse nce . And the supreme fallier is the most persedi one. There re the flight of the mitid towards God is called by the PlatonicS φυνὴ μονου κήαι μόνον. The supreme heing, stilli Plotinus, as heexcludes ali diversi ty is ever alii e present. And we are then present tollim, when, recollected and abstracted Dom the worid and sensibi e ob-jests, we are most Dee and disen gaged ' from ali varie ty. He adda,
that in the intuition of the supreme deity the foui finds her wimed forend and repose; Whicli that philosopher calis wahing out of his hodyinto himself
tians, we are taught that the supreme being is not the cause of any crea ted thing ; but that he produced or made the word; and that ali crea ted beings were made by the word, whicli is accordingly styled the cause of ali causes : and that this was also the doctrine of the Chaldeans. Plato, lihewise, in his letter to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus, spealis of God the ruter and cause of ali things as having a fallier : and, in his Epirio-mis, he expressy teacheth that the word or made the worid. Accord- ingly Saint Augustine in his commentary on the beginning of Saini John's Gospei, having declared that Christ is the wisdom of God by whicli allthings were made, observes that this doctrine was also found in the writ-ings of philosophers, who taught that God had an only begotten Son byWhom a re ali things.
splendid and magnificent an intellest not lese deep and clear ; yet it is
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not to be supposed, that ei ther he or any other philosophers of Greece orthe East, had by the light of nature attained an adequale notion of the Holy Trinity, nor even that their imperfect notion, se far as it went, Was exactly just ι nor perhaps that those sublime hinis, whicli dari forthlike fasties of light in the midst os a profound dari ness, were originalty struch from the hard rock of human reason ; hut rather derived, at leastin pari, by a divine tradition ' Dom the author of ali things. It seems a re mari able confirmation of this, what, Plotinus observed in his fifth AEneid, that this doctrine os a Trinity, fallier, mind, and Qui, Was nolate invention, but an ancient tenet.
361. Certa in it is, that the notion os a Trinity is to be found in the writ ings of many old hea thera philosophers, that is to say, a notion ofthree divine hypostales. Authori ty, light, and lik did, to the eye of
reason, plain ly appear to suppori, pervade and anima te the mundano system or macrocota. The samo appea red in the microcosm, preservingsoul and body, enlighte ning the mines, and moving the affections. Andthese were conceived to be necessary universat principies, cooexisting, and cooperat ing in such sert, ns ne ver to exist a funder, but on the contraryto constitute one fovereigia os ali things. And, indeed, hoπ could powor or aut hori ty avail or subsiast without lino ledget or either without ii se and action ta6et. In the administration of ali things there is authori ty to est ablim, lais to dirces, and justice to execute. There is first the urce of allpersection, or fons deitatis, secondiy the supreme rea n, Order, or M-, and lastly the spirit whicli qui cliens and inspires. We are sprung stomthe fallier, irradiated or enlightened by thesin, and moved by the spirit. Certa in ly, that there is fallier, son, and spirit; that these bear analogyio the sun , light, and heat; and are other Nise expressed by the ter ins
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Siris. principie, mind, and foui; by one or τὸ ἰή, intellect, and lise; by good, Word, and love ; and that generation was not attributed to the 1econdhypostasis, the - or λαυος, in respect of time ', but only in respect of origin and order, as an eternat necessary emanation ; these are the express tenets of Platonisis, Pythagoreans, AEgyptians, and Chaldeans.
that sublime subject inhuman writings, whicli doth not bear the lare sig- tures of humani ty ; yet it cannot be dented, that severat se thers of thuchurch have thought sit to illustrate the christi an doctrine of the Holy grini ty, by similitudes and expressions borrowed Dom the most eminentheathens, whom they conceived to have been no strangers to that mystery ; as liath been plainly proved by Bessarian, Eugubinus, and doctor Cud orth.
to many of the present age yet it is certain, the men os greatest fame and learning among the ancient philosophers held a Trinity in the God-hea d. It must be o ned, that upon this potnt sonae later Platonisis of the Gentile world seem to have bewildered them selves, as many Christians have also done) while they pursu ed the hinis derived Dom their pre- decessors, with too much curiosi ty.
ry, not to be lightly treated os, or ram ly divulged. Where re in a letterio Dionysius he writes as he himself professe th) aenigmaticalty and brieflyin the following ternas, which he giveth sor a summa rv of his notion conccrning the supreme being, and which being capable of divers senses, I
leave to be de cyphered by the learn ed rea de r. περὶ τον παντων βασιλ α παντ εςι,