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CorolZav.-Individua things are nothinibu modifications of God' attributes, o modes by hic theattributes of God are expresse in a definite and determinate manner. The proos is manifest romyrop. Is an def. s. PROP. 6. A t in that has Men determine to avaetion has necessaria Meno determine θ God andone Mat has no been Herminedi God cannos determine usu so ac son. Proow-That by hic things are sal tote determine to any actio is necessarii something positive aiis set evident therefore God by the necessit of his nature, is the essicient cause a Wellis iis essen e
and ars determinate existence, anno exist oris δε-urmineae o v ariton, unias is te determine so exis ence an clinion θ another cause hiemis riso sinu and has a determinate exisunce I and again this cause cannotexis , orrae determine to an action, unus urae determine so existene and actionis another, hic is also sinise antrias a determinate existence, anis to insini T. Proow-Whateve is determine to existence an toaction is so determine by God a 6 anta4 eor.). Butthat hic is finite an has a determinate existen ecould not have been produce by the absolute natureo an attribute os God for hateve folloKs rom
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the absolute naturem an attributeis God is infinite and ternat et 13. It must therefore have followedfrom Gomor rom ome attribute of his in sociar ascitis considere a affecte by some moden or besides substance an modes there is nothinc ario et anaedem Manae s) an modes as coro are nothing ut modifications os God' attributes. ut rom God oran attribute of his in sociar a that attribute is auefecte by a modificatio that is terna an infinite, it could not have followed et a). It must, herelare, have followed from, o have been determine to existando operate by God o by ome attribute of his, in sociar ascit is modified by some modificatio thatis finite an has determinate existence. Whic Wasthe firsi potnt. In the secon place this cause, in turn, o this mode θ Me fame rasonivra inicis me have jus p vecta, si par of iqis proposition), mustalso have been determine by another, hic also is finite an has determinate existence, an again his laso b Meuam reasoning by another, an soles ' Mesam reasonine to infinity. Q. E. D. as Molium.-Since certain things mus have been produce by God immediately, i. e. thos thing that
ceived withou God, it follows : irst that God is the absolutet proximate cause of the things immediatelyproduce by himself, but o after their ind, ascissaid For God' effect can either e nor e Conceived without thei cause is an a , coro It folloWS seCond that God cannot properi be calle theremote cause of individua things, excepi perhaps forthis reason, that we a distinguisti them rom thethings which he has produce immediately or, ather, whicli follo fro his absolute nature Fori remote
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PROP. avi O GOD. 49 Cause, mean one that is in no a connecte miihil effect But at thing that re are in God, andare so dependent pon Godoliat vetithout im theyneither canis nori conCeived. ΡROP. 9. There is in nature nothin contingent butia Mino are determine θ the necessis of the divinena re to exis and Io opera e ima de ite προ Proj.-Whateve is, is in God 153. God hoWever, annot be calle a contingent thing. For ii)he exist necessarily, no contingently. The modes, surthermore, of the divine nature have ollowed romit necessarily, no contingenti i 6 and that too, Whether the divine nature e considere absolutely ai), or hether it e considere a determine toactio in a definite Way a 73. Oreover God is notoni the cause of these modes, in sociar a the exist
simplo a , oro, but also et 6 in sociar a the are considere a determine to any action. ut is theyaremo determine by God θ Me fame proposition), it is, no contingent, but impossibi that the determine themselves an on the theriand ar) i the have been determine by God, it is no contingent, ut
impossibi that the rende themselves undetermined. Where fore, at things have been determined by the necessit of the divine nature, not ni to exist butalso to exist an to operate in a definite Way, and thereis noth in contingent. Q. E. D. Misolium.-Before goin surther I Wis here to explain or ather cali attention to What, must under- stando natura naturans an natura naturata.' a
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thin i by this time appears from the preceding that bynatura naturans e must understand that hic is initself an is conceived through iself, or Such attributes of substanc a express ameternat an infinite essenco that is i 4 corio an I7, cor a), God in sociar as eis considere as a re cause B natura naturata, hoWever, I mean ali that hic follows rom thenecessit os God' nature, or rom the necessit ofeach of God' attributes, that is, at the modes of God's attributes, in sociar a the are considere a thingsthat are in God, and cannot be or e conceived Withou God. PROP. o. An undensand g, acta in ue orietu-
au in iure, must comprerien Me auribules of Golandrae modi cations o God, and noctis esse. Proj.- true idea must agre With that hic it represent saxiom ), that is a is selferident), that whic is containe objectivel in the understandingmus necessarii exist in nature. ut in nature i , cor Ihthere istut one substance, that is, God nor arethere an other modifications 15 than hos that arein God, and whicli sis the fame proposition without God can neither emori conceived Therefore, an understanding, actuali finite or actuali infinite must comprehen the attributes of God and the modifications o God, and nothingilse Q. E. D. PROP. 3I. An actua undensandiu miserare nicte orin ite, as also tu destre Iove, etc., Mouldue referreaeso natura naturata anae notu natura naturans.
ceived through absolute thought that is 15 aniae f
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63, it must e conceived by ome attribute o God hic expresses the eterna an infinite essence of thought in suo a manne that, Without it, it canneltheri nor e conceived And ence 29, Mαὶ
Scholium.-The reason hyo here spea o an actuat understandiniis no that Ladmi that there is an potentia understandinx but because I Wished toavoid ali confusion, Presolve to speaconi os a thingperceived by us a Clearly asaea be that is, of intellectio itself than hichiothiniis perceived by us more Clearly For e can apprehen nothing that cloes notconduce to a more perfectanowledge of intellection. PROP. 3 a The wiu cannot be caluae a re bullani a
cannot exist, or be determine to operate, uniescit bedetermine by ome ther cause, and this again byanother, an somno infinity. ut i a illis sup- posed infinite, it also musti determine to exis andio operate by God, no in so aras heris a substanc absolutely infinite, but in fossaris he has an attribute Whichexpresses the infinite and terna natur of thought a33. In hateve Way therefore, it e Conceived, Whether a finite o as infinite, it requires a cause byπhic tot determined to exis and to operate 'here- fore defraxit cannotae calle a free, butini a necessar o Constratne cause Q. E. D. Corauar I. Ηence, it folioWs, first that God does no ac from the reedom of his ili. Corollar a. -It tolloWg, second that ili an un-
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and est, an absolutei as ali natura things, hi ch as must be determine by Godo ex is andri operate in a desinite way. For ill like allisther illings, need a cause, by whicli tote determine to ex is andio ac in a definite way And although grante Willor understanding there folio an infinit of things stili, God cannot for that reason e sal to ac fromthe reedom os his it an more than e an be- cause of the thing that result rom motion an rest for rom them lso an infinit of things result), besai to ac from the reedom o motion an rest Whence Will elong no more to the natureis Godthan do the natura things, but is relate loci in the fame Way a motion an rest, an allisther naturalthings, Whicli, have hoWn to solio from the necessit of the divine nature, an to e determine byritto exist an to operate in a definite Way. PROP. 33. Thius cous have been producedis God in no Mer ων, and in no Memorderi than Mem is Mens ducet Proos. For at things necessarii solio from thenature o God a given 163, an from the necessit ofGod' nature re determine to exist an to operate in a definite Way 293. Is thereiore things could have
been o another nature, o could have been determinedio operate in an othe way so that the orderis natur Would have been different, the nature o Godcould also have been other than it no is ence ii),
this ther nature also, Would have ad to exist and. consequently there Could have been tW o more
Gods, Which I , cor I is absurd. Wherefore things could have been produce in no the way, and in noother order, than, etc. Q. E. D.
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sarii follows either rom iis essence an definition orsrom a give essicient cause. In the secon place forthes sam reason a thiniis sal to e impossibis Ieitheriecauserit essencem definition involves a contradiction, or ecause there is no externa cause thatis determine so the productionis such a thing. Buta thiniis sal tot contingens formo otheraeason than with respectu a defeci inivr knowledge. For a thing, the essence of Whicli, do notano rio involve a contradiction, or hicli, knowWello involve o contradiction, an stili an amrm nothin Wit certain ty
necessar o impossibie; and therefore, e cali iteither contingentis possibie. Misolium .-From the precedin it clearly followstha things have been produce by God in the highest
perfection, since the have necessarii followed roma Ost perfeci nature No does his convici God ofan imperfection fortis perfectio has compelle usto assirm this Nay, from the contrar os this it ould clearly follo. as have just horun that God is notsupremel perfeci; ecause of course i things adbeen produce in an othe way another natur Would
have tot attribute to God, different rom that Whichue have been compelle to attributeo him rom a
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considerationis the mos perfectieing. Butes clo notdoub that man will reject this viemas absurd, and wil not be illincto appinthei minos to the considerationi it, and that rom no ther reason than because they have been accustomeda attributerio Godanother freedola very different rom that whicli,e have
given him de . 73, that is, absolute Will But I also domo doub that, is the were illin to thin about
the matter, an to righil conside the sequence of myproofs, the Would quite reject an such reedom asthe noW attributerio God asiein notini Worthless, but also a reat obstacle o nowledge Nor is it necessar for mea here repeat What has atready beensaid in the schol. to prop. 7. Nevertheless, sor their
ness. ut since in ternit there is no hen, hesore,or after from the mere perfectio os God i follows that God neve can, nor neve could have decree anythingislsen that is, God Was notiefore his oWn decrees, nor an e e Without them But the say, evensupposing that God ad made nature different, orhad decreed omethin eis from ternit Wit regardio nature an sit order, ne could not from that infer any
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mit that God can change his oWn decrees. For i Godlia decreed, it regarest natur anxit order, anything et se than he has decreed that is, ad Wille and conceived Wit regar to nature someth in else, hewould necessarii have had another intellec tha thathemo has and another Will than that he no has Andi one ma attributerio God another intellec and another Wil Without an change in his essencei in his perfection: hat is the reaso that he cannot noWchange his oWn decrees it respectri create things, an stili remain a perfect y For his intellect and will, concern in create things and their order, are, Mithrespectrio his own essence and perfection, just the fame, howsoeve the be conceived Again, at the philosopher I have seen admit that there is in odio intellectpotentialty but ni actually. Since, hoWever both his intellec an his ill aremo distinguished rom his essence, as indeed ali admit, it sollows rom his also, that, i God ad had actuali another intellec and another Will, his essence also ould necessarii have been different an consequently a I conclude a first), is things ad been produce by God other than theyno are, God's intellec an his ill that is ascis admitted), his essence, ould have had tote different:
whicli is absurd. Since, therefore things could have been produced by God in no the way or order, an sincerit folioWstro the supreme perfectionis God that this is true
assuredi no ound reason an persuadem to belleve
that God has not Wille to create ali the thing thatare in his intellec in the fame perfection in hicli eapprehend them But the say, in thing there is no perfectionis imperfection that hic is in them, naccount of hic the are perfectis imperfeci, and
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is areat absurdity. Whereforet, I an turn thei argument against themselves, thus Al things dependupo the poWer o God Therefore, for thing to bedifferent, God' Wil Would also necessarii have to bedifferent. But God' Wil cannot be different as ehave just hoWn mos clearly rom the perfectio ofGod). Therefore things also cannot e different. Iconfess his ieW, hic subjecis ali hing to a certain indifferent illis God, and mahes ali hings dependispo his good pleasure, is ess id of the truth tha that of thos who mahe God do at things