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therelare He commanda them to repent. But in repent is nothing elso than to profess and to assirm that one Will sin nomore. Theresore they are pardoned who unaWares and incau
is subject to tho dominion os sin in a threetoid manner in deeds, in morti, and thoughis. By these steps justice advances to tho greatest height. Thofirat stop of viriue is to abstain hom evit morks; tho second, to abstain also from evit Words; the third, to abstain even Domitio thoughts of evit things. Ho Who ascenti tho fidit step is suffciently just; he who ascenda tho second is noW of perfectvirtus, since ho offends neither in deeds nor in conversation; he who ascenda the third appears truly to havo attained tholikeness of God. For it is almost beyond the measuro of mannot even to admit to the thought y that whicli is either bad in action or improper in speech. Therelare even just men, Who
In cogitationem. Oinera rein cogitatione.
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nelther mahe use of them nor givo thanks becausis they have received them, hoW much more just and truo is it to reverenco
U, therelare, mercy is a distinguished and excellent gist in man, and that is judged to bo very good by the consent both of the good aud the evit, it appears that philosophera Were far
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erring y throuo the appearance of good, they sali into evila, While they are ignorant of the distinction belween good thingsand erit. These things ars not indeed falso, but they are alireferred in the bov. For to be frugal, or constant, or cautious, Or ciam, or grao, Or severe, are virtves indeed, but virtves Which relate to this stiori liso. But ws Who despiss this litohave other virium set besore us, respecting Which philosophera vid not by any means even conjecture. There oro theyregarded certain viriues as vices, and certain Vices as virium.
nature as underlahen throuo a pervertia opinion ; and there-
do effeci: in tho meantime their purposo is arrogant and almost
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man as much as is suffcient for nature. Not an unWiso di
putation, is, as I said, ait things mero not referred to this lila. The Stoics thereforo are mad who do not regulato but cui them
serpenta, or rage hom Wild beasta, or gentienem frem catile. For inoso qualities Which have been given separalely to dumbanimais, are altogether given to man at the samo time. But is,as physicians assim, tho affection of joy has ita seat in thospleon, that os anger in the gall, of desim in tho liver, os fear in tho heari, it is easter to kill the animal itself than in diar an thing hom the body; for this is to Wish in chango the nature of tho living creature. But the ahilsul men do not underatandthat When they talio aWay Vices from man, they also talis a vvlatue, sor Which alone they ars mahing a place. For it it is virtus in tho midst of tho impetuosio os anger to restrain and chech oneself, Which they cannot deny, then he who is mithout anger is also Without virtve. Is it is virtus to contres tho lustof the bodri ho must be fres hom virtuo who has no lust whichho may regulate. Is it is virtus to cuis sto destro homeovsting that Which belonga to another, ho certainj can have no virtus Who is Without that, to the restrianing of Which tho exerciso os virtuo is applied. Where, therefore, them aro novices, there is no place even sor Virtus, as there is no place forvicium Where there is no adversary. And so it comes in passthat there can bo no good in this life Without evit. An inestion ius fore is a Und os natural fruit ulness of tho ponere of the mind. For as a fiald Whicli is naturalty Imittes produces an abundant crop of briar' so the mind whicli is uncultivaledis ovorgrown With vices flourishing ol their oWn accord, as Withthoras. But When tho true cultivator has applied himself, immediately vices inve Way, and the fruits of Viriues spring up. Therofore God, Whon IIo first made man, With mondor viseresight fidit implanted in him these emotions of the tand,
Uberina animorum.' Exuberat in aenim,' luxuriatea into briara.
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that he might bo capsilo os receiving virtus, as the earili is of cultivation; and Ho placed tho subject-matter os vices in the affections, and that of virtus in vices. For assumdly virtve Will
regata to those four affections whicli they imagine to arisshom tho opinion of things good and evit, is tho eradication ot ieh they thinh that the mind of the wise man is to be healed, since they underetand that they are implanted by nature, and that without theso nothing can bo put in motion, nothing bo
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sor tho salis of embellishing the sine and increasing iis copious-ness, or at any rate that thv do not greatly differ frem onoanother. For both desim tines iis boginning hom the inclinatiou, and caution arises hom fear, and joy is nothing eiss thanthe expression ot glian s. But let us supposo that they aro different, as they themselves mill havs it. Accordin*y they willsu stat destre is continued and perpetuat inclination, but that juis gladnem bearing ilaeis immoderately; and that tiar is caution in excess, and passing the limits of moderation. Thus it comesto pras, that they do not talis aWay thoso things Whicli theythinh ought to bo tahen aWay, but regulato them, since thenames only are changed, the things themselves remalia. Theytheresore retum una ares to that potnt at Which tho Peripat lics arri- is argument, that Vices, sinco they cannot bo tahenaWay, are to be regulated mitti moderation. Therelaro thsyere, bemum they do not succeed in effecting that which theyaim at, and by a circuitous muto, Whicli is long and mugh, they return to tho fame path. CHAP. XVI of the amotiona, and the resistation of the opinionos the Peripateties eoneerning them; what is tu proper Me of tha ametiona, and what is a bad me of them. But I thinh that tho Peripateties did not even approach thetruth, Who allo that they are vices, but regulate them Withmodoration. For Wε must be Deo even from moderata vices;
causes of tho affections, and not tho affections themselves, mustia moderated. must not, thv say, rejoico missi excessive
jori but moderately and temperaraly. This is as though th ahould say that Wo must not run s istin but Walh quietiy. Butit is possibis that ho Who Walhs may er' and that he Who runs may hev the right path. What is I sho that thoro is a caso in which it is victous not only to rejoico moderatein but even in thesmallest degree; and that there is another case, on the contrary, in Which oven to exest With transporis ot ioy is is no means
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Whether they thinh that a Wiso man ought in re iace it he mesany evit happening to his enemy; or Whether ho ought to curbhis joy, is by the conquest os enemies, or ths overthrow os a tyrant, liberty and sa have been acquired by his munt men. No ons doubis but that in the formor cam to retoice a litile, and in tho latrar to rejoico too litile, is a Very great crime. Me may say the fame respecting the oster affections. But, asI have said, the object of Wisdom does not consist in the regulation os these, but os their causes, sines they are acted uponsrom Withoui; nor Was it befitting that these themselves inouldbe restrained; since they may exist in a smali degres With thogreatest criminali , and in the meatest degreo mithout any criminali . But they ought is have been assignod is fixed times, and circumstances, and places, that they may not bovices, when it is permitted us to mino a right uso os them. For as in Walh in tho right muris is good, but in Wander fromit is evit, so to bo moved by the affections to that Which is rightis good, but to that Which is corrupi is evit. For sensual d
ardent, yet is Without sauit. But is it destres an unlawsul objeci, although it be moderate, yet it is a great vice. Therelareit is not a diseras to be anyy, nor to destre, nor in be excitedis lusi; but. to be passionate, to be covetous or licentious, is a diserae. For he who is passionale is angry even With him missi Whom he ought not to M angry, or at times When he ought not. He Who is covetous destres oen that whicli is unnece sary. ΗΘ Who is licentious puraues even that Whicli is fombidden by tho laws. The wholo matter ought is have turnedon this, that since the impetuosiu of these things cannot borestrianed, nor is it right that it should be, becauso it is nece
sarily implanted lar maintaining ths duties os lise, it mightractor be directed into the right Way, Where it may be possibis
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for the fas of instruction, thoso which I thinh to bo most closely related to tho subjeci. They regard dread or sear as a very great vice, and thinh that it is a very great wealineas ofmind; the opposito to Which is bravery: and is this exista in aman, they say that them is no place for fear. Does any onothon belleus that it can possibiy happon that this samo fear istho highest fortitude ' no means. For nature does notappear in admit that anything should tali bach in iis contrary. But yet L not by any shilsul conclusion, as Socrates does in the writings of Plato, Who compeis inose against Whom he disputes in admit thoas things Whicli they had dented, but in asimplo manner, Will sh- that the greatest tiar is the greatost virtus. No ono doubis but stat it is tho pari os a timid and
or death; and is any one does not dread ali these, ho is judgeda man of the greatest fortitude. But ho Who feres God is fresfrom the sear of ali these things. In proof of whicli, thero lano need os arguments: for the punishmenta inflicted on tho Wo fhippers of God have been Witnessed at ali times, and ara stillwitnessed through the woriri in the tormenting of whom neW and unusual tortures havo been devised. For the mind shrinlis homthe recollection os various Ends of death, When the bulchery offaVage monstera has raged even beyond dealli itasti. But ahappy and unconquered patience endured these execrabie lac rations of their bodies mithout a groan. This virtus affordad the meatost astonishment to ait people and provinces, and to thotorturere themselves, When crueity Was overcome is patience. But this virtus Was caused by nothing elso than the fear of
Stoics maintain, nor in be restrianet M the Peripatetica mish, but to be directed into the right Way; and apprehensions ars tobo taen amari but so that this one only may bs test: for sincethis is tho only la fui and trus one, it Mons effecta that allother things may not bs feared. Destro also is rectoned among
vices; but it it destres thom things Which ars of the earth, it is a vico; on tho other hand, is it destres heavenly things, it is a virtue. For he who destres to obtain justice, God, perpetuallite, evertasting light, and ali those things Which God promis
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The Stoie wili perhaps say that inclination is necessary sortho attainment of these inings, and not destre; but, in truth, tho inclination is not sufficient. For many havo tho inclination ; but When pain has approached the vitais, inclination gives Way, but desim perseveres: and is it effecta that ali thingsWhich are fought is othera are objecis ot contempt in him, itis tho greatest virtus, since it is the mother of self-restraint. d there oro Wo ought rather to effect this, that We may rightly direct tho affections, a corrupi use of Whicli is vice. Forthese excitements of the minit resemble a harnessed chariot, in
liave besoro taught, me must is no means spare our properi ythat me may preserve hindness and justico, it is not a virtve to