The works of George Berkeley, D.D. late Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland. To which is added, an account of his life [by J. Stock] and several of his letters to Thomas Prior, Esq., Dean Gervais, and Mr. Pope, etc

발행: 1784년

분량: 705페이지

출처: archive.org

분류: 미분류

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ΡASSIVE OBEDIENCE,

OR, THE

CHRISTI AN DOCTRINE

LAW of NATURE.

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THAT an absolute passive obedience ought not tobe paid to any civit power: but that submisi1on to go-vernment mould be measu red and limited by the publicgood of the society; and that there re subjects may law- fully resist the supreme authori ty, in those cases Where the public good shali plainly seem to require it: nay, thatit is their duty to do so, inasmuch as they are ali under an in dispensabie obligation to promote the common interest :these and the like notions, whicli I cannot help thinhingpernicious to mankinii and repugnant to right re on, hav-ing of late years been industriousy cultiva ted, and set in the most advantageous lights by men os paris and learn-ing, it seemed necessary to arm the youth of our Universi-ty against them, and talae care they go in to the world wellprincipied ; I do not mean obstinately prejudiced in favouros a party, but stom an early acquaintance With their duty, and the clear rational grounds of it, determine i to sicli

B et

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Tu the REA DE R. In this vlew, I made three discourses not many monilis since in the College-chas ei, whicli some who heard themthought it might be of use to mahe more public : and in-deed, the false accounts that are gone abroad concerning them, have made it necessary. Accordingly Ι now sendthem into the worid under the form of one entire discourse. To conclude; as in Writing these thoughis it was myendeavour to preserve that cool and impartiat temper whichbecomes every sincere enquirer after truth, Ι heartilywissi they may be read with the fame disposition.

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vernment and constitution of these Lingdoms , much lese to pretend todetermine concerning the meriis of the different parties now reigning in the state. Those topics I profess to lie out of my sphere, and they will probably be thought hy most men, improper to be treated os in an audience almost Wholly made up of young persons, set apari stom the bu- sinesi and noise of the worid, for their more convenient instruction inlearning and piety. But surely it is in no respect unsultable to the circumstances of this place to inculcate and explain every branch of thelaw of nature; or those virtu es and duties whicli are equalty binding in every hingdom or society of men under heaven; and of this hind Ι taheto he that christian duty of not resisting the supreme power implied in my text. Gosever re leth the poπer, ressera the ordinance of God Intreating on which words I mali observe the solio ing method. IL First, I mali endeavour to prove, that there is an absolute unlimited non-resistance or passive obedience due to the supreme civit power, Whereuer placed in any nation. Secondiy, I mali enquire in to thegrounds and reasons of the contrary opinion. Thirdly, I mali considerthe

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the objections drawn hom the pretended consequences os non- resistanceto the supreme power. In handi ing these potnis, I intend not to bulldon the authority of holy scripture, but altogether on the principies of reason common to ali man kind; and that, hecause there a re some very rational and learned men, who being verit' persuaded, an absolute passive subjection to any earthly po er, is repugnant to right rea Qn, caniae ver bring thenaseives to admit suci, an interpretation of holy scripture howe ver natural and obvious fio m the words) as shali malie that a part os christi an religion, which seems to them in iiself manifest ly absurd, and destructive of the original inherent risitis of human nature. III. I do not mean to treat os that submission, whicli men are ei ther in duty or prude nee obliged to pay inferior or executive powers; nei thershali I consider where, or in what persons the supreme or legislative po er is lod ged in this or that go vertament. Only thus much I shalli alie for granted, that there is in every civit communi ty, seme where orcther, placed a supreme power of mahing laws, and ensorcing the observation os them. The fulsiilling of those laws, ei ther by a punctu alperforma iace of what is enjoined in them, or, is that be inconssistent withreason or conscience, by a patient submission to Whate ver penalties thesupreme power halli annexed to the neglect or transgression of them, ister med Astatu; as ora the other hand, the mali ing use of Orce and open violence, ei ther to with fland the execution of the laws, or ward Osf the penalties appo in ted by the supreme power, is properly named rebellion. Now to malae it evident, that every degree of rebellion is criminal in thesia est; I mali in the first place endea uour to prove that loyalty is a natural or morat duty; and dissoyalty or rebellion in the most strict and proper sense, a vice or breach of the law of nature. Anil secondiy, I propose to me AE that the prohibitions of vice, or negative precepis of thelaw of nature, as, Thou mali not commit adultery, Thou mali not sors ear thyself, Thou shali not resist the supreme power, and the like, ought

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ought to be talien in a most absolute, necessary, and immutabie sense: in much, that the attain ment of the great est good, or deli verance Domthe greatest evit, that can besal any man or number of men in this life

may not justisy the least violation of them. First then 1 am to me that loyalty is a morat duty, and dissoyalty or rebellion in the most strict and

proper sense a vice, or breach of the law of nature. IV. Though it be a potnt agreed amongst ali wise men, that thereare certain morat rules or laws of nature, whicli carry with them aneternat and indispensabie obligation , yet concerning the proper methodSsor discovering those laoes, and distingui ming them Do m others dependent on the humour and discretion of men, there a re varioUS opinion S; seme direct us to look for them in the divine ideas, others in the natural inscriptions on the mind; me derive them Do m the authori ty oflearned men, and the universat agreement and consent of nations.

Lastly, others hold that they are only to he disco vered by the deductions os reason. The three sirst methods must be acknowledged to labo urunder great dissi culties, and the last has not, that I know, been a nywhere distinctly explained, or treat ed of so fully as the importance of the subject doth deserve . I hope there re it will be pardoned, is in a dis- course of passive obedience, in order to lay the foundation of that dutythe de eper, we mahe so me en quiry into the origin, nature, and obligation of morat duties in generat, and the criterious where by they a re to-

V. SelLIove being a principie of ali others the most universal, and themost deeply engraven in our hearis, it is natural for us to regard things,as they are fitted to augment or impair our o n happinest; and accord- ingly we denominate them good or evit. Our judgment is e ver employed in distingui ming beliseen these two, and it is the whole businesse of our lives, to en dea uour, by a proper application of our faculties, to procurethe

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the one and avoid the other. At our fir st coming in to the worid, we areenti rely guided by the impressions os sense, sensibie plea iure being the infalli ble characteristic os present good, as pain is of evit. But by degreCS, RS We grOW VP in Our acquaintance with the nature of things, experience informs us that present good is aster ards ost attended with agreater evil and on the other fide, that present evit is not lesi frequently the occasion os procuring to us a greater future good. Besides, as thenobter faculties of the human ul begin to display them solves, they diseCo VCr to Us goods far more excellent than those whicli assedi the senses. Hence an alteration is wrought in Our judgmenis, Ne no longer complywith the sirsi solicitations os sense, hut stay to consider the remote consequences of an action, What good may be hoped, or what evil feared Dom it, according to the wonted course of things. This obliges us frequently to overtook present momentary enjoyments, when they come incompetition with greater and more lassing goods, though too far oss, oros too refined a nature to affect our senses. VI. But as the whole ear th, and the entire duration of those perim ingthings contained in it, is altogether inconsiderabie, or in the prophet's expressive stile, les than nothing in respect of eterni ty, who stes not that every reas nable man ought so to frame his actions, as that they maymost effectu alty contribute to promote his eternat interest y And since itis a trulli evident by the light of nature, that there is a QVereign omnis.

ble: it plain ly sollows, that a conformi ty to his will, and not any prospectos temporal ad vantage, is the sole rule where by every man who acts Iapto the principies of reason, must go vern and square his actions. The fame conclusion doth likewi se evidently result Do m the relation whicli God bears to his creatures. God alone is malier and preserver of allthings. He is there re with the most undoubted right the great legisla

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tor of the world; and mankind are by ali the ties of duty, no test than interest, bound to obey his la s. VII. Hence we mould above ali things endeavour to trace out the divine will, or the generat desigit os Providence With regard to mankind, and the methods most directly tending to the accomplis liment of that design, and this seems the genuine and proper Way for disco vering the lawsos nature. For laws heing rules directive of our actions to the end intended by the legislator, in order to atta in the knowledge of God's laws, we ought first to en quire what that end is, which he designs mouid bocarried on by human actions. Now, as God is a being of infinite good-ness, it is plain the end he proposes is good. But God ei oying in himself ali possibie persection, it follows that it is not his o n good, but that

of his creatures. Again, the morat actions of men are enti rely terminated with in themselves, so as to have no influence on the other ordersos intelligences or rea nable creatures: the end theresere to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of men. But as nothing in anatural state can entille one man more than another to the favour os

God, excepi only morai goodne sis, Whicli consisting in a consor mi ty tot he laws of God, doth presuppost the being of such laws, and law eversupposing an end, to whicli it gui des our actions, it sollows that antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can he conceived he- tween men; that end there re it self or generat design os Providen ce isnot determine d or limited by any respect os persens: it is not there rethe private good of this or that man, nation or age, but the generalwell-being of ali men, os ali nations, of ali ages of the worid, whicli God desii gns mould be procured by the concurring actions of each individual. Having thus disco vered the great end, to whicli ali morat obligations are subordinate; it remains, that we enquire What methods a re necessary for the obtaining that end. UOL. II.

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VIII. The well-being of mankind must necessari ly be carried on oneos these two ways: et ther first, without the injunction of any certa in Universal rules of morali ty, only by obliging every one u pon ea cli particular occasion, to consuli the public good, and always to do that, Whichto him shali stem in the present time and circumstanceS, most to Con duce to it. Or secondiy, by et oining the observation os sonae determinate, est abii med laws, whicli, is universalty practi sed, have Dom the nature of things an essentiat sitnest to procure the well-being of manliin d; though in their particular application, they a re semetimes through unto ardaccidenis, and the perverse irregulari ty of human wilis, the occasions os great sufferings, and missor tunes, it may be, to Very many good men.

Against the former of these methods there lie severat strong objections. For brevi ty I mali mention only tWO. IX. First, it will thence sollow, that the best men sor want of judg-ment, and the wisest for want of knowing ali the hidden circumstances and Consequences of an action, may very osten be at a lossi ho to be-

have them ives , whicli they would not be, in case they judged of eachaction, by comparing it with so me particular precepi, rather than byexamining the good or evit whicli in that single instance it tends to procure: it being far more easy to judge with certa in ty, whether such orsu cli an action be a transgression of this or that precepi, than whetherit will be attended with more good or ill consequences. In shori, to calculate the evenis of each particular action is impossibie, and though it were not, Would yet talae up too much time to be of use in the aifairsos lise. Secondly, is that method be observed, it will follow that wec an have no sure standard, to whicli comparing the actions of another, we may pron Ounce them good Or bad, Viriues Or vices. For since thenaealare and rule of e very good man's actions is supposed to be nothingelse, but his own private di sim teressed opinion, of what mahes most forthe public good at that juncture: and since this opinion must una voida

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