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' than whicli nothing can he of more mischievous consequence to mani ind. But aster ali, ii there be any man, who et ther cannot or will not see theabsurdi ty and pernici ousnest of those notions, he would, I doubi not, he convinced with a witness, in ca se they should Once hecome current, and e very private man talie it in his head to belle ve them true, and putthem in practice. XXV. But there stili remalias an objection, which hath the appea rance of sorne strengili against what has been se id. Nam ely, that whereas civit poli ty is a thing enti rely of human institution, it stems contraryto reason, to malae submission to it part of the law of nature, and notrather of the civit law. For how can it be imagined that nature mould dictate or prescribe a natural law about a thing, whicli depends on the arbitrary humour of men, not only as to iis hind or serm, whicli is very various and mutabie, but even a 8 to iis existence; there being no whereto be found a civit go vertament set up by nature. In an Mer to this, Iobserve firR, that most morat precepis do presupposse seme voluntary actions, or pacts of men, and are ne verthelesi esse emed lari s of nature.
Property is assigned, the signification of word S asteria ined, and matrimo ny contracted by the agreement and consent of manliind ; and for ali thalit is not doubted, Whether thest, falsehood, and adultery be prohibited by the law of nature. Loyalty, theresere, though it mould suppose and bellie result os human Institutions, may, for ali ibat, be of natural obliga tion. I say, secondly, ibat, notri illi standing particular societies are forma ed by men, and are not in ali places ali he, a S things esteemed naturalare wont to be, yet there is implanted in manliind a natural tendency ordisposition to a sociat litie. I cali it naturat, because it is universal, and hecause it necessarily resulis Dom the differen ces whicli distinguim mansrom beast: the peculiar wanis, appetites, faculties, and capacities of man, being exactly calculated, and framed for such a state, in much
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sui table to his nature. And since the bonil and cement of society is a submission to iis la s, it pia inly follows, that this duty hath an equalright with any other to he thought a law of nature. Anil surely that precept which enjoins obedience to civit laws, cannot itself with any
Propriety be accounted a civit law: it musto there fore ei ther have no obligation at ali On the conscience, or is it hath, it must be derived Dom theuniversal voice of nature and reason.
XXVI. And thus the fir st psint proposed seems clearly made out:
namely, that loyalty is a virtve or morat duty ; and dissoyalty or rebellion, in the most strict and proper sense, a vice or crime against the la of nature. We are now come to the second potni, which was to me , that the prohibitions of vice, or negative precepis of morali ty, are to beta ken in a most absolute, necessary, and immutabie sense; in much that the attain ment of the greatest good, or deli verance Dom the greatest evit;
that can besal any man or number of men in this lise, may not justisy the least violation of them. Eut in the firsi place, I mali expla in the rea nos distinguishing be tween positive and negative precepis, the lalter onlybeing included in this generat proposition. Now the ground of that disti iunion may be resolved in to this; namely, that very osten, et therthrough the dissicut ty or number of morat actions, or their inconsisten cewith each other, it is not possibie sor orae man to perform severat of them at the se me time; whereas it is plainly consistent and possibie, that any man should, at the fame time, absta in stom ali manner of positive
actions what ever. Herace it comes to past, that prohibitions or negative precepis mus by every one, in ali times and places, be ali actuallyobserved: whereas those ri hich enjoin the doing of an action, allow room for human pruden ce and discretion, in the execution of them : it for themost pari depending on various accidental circumstances; alt whicli oughtto be considered, and care talien that duties of lese moment do not interfere With, and hinder the fulsit ling of those whicli are more important.
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23 Dis urse of Postve Obedience.
And sor this reason, is not the positive laws them lues, at least theexerci se of them admits of suspension, limitation, and diversi ty of de-grees. As to the indispensabiene se of the negative precepis of the law of nature, I mali in iis proos offer two arguments ; the first Do m the nature of the thing, and the second stom the imitation os God in his govern mentos the worid. XXVII. First then, froin the nature of the thing, it hath been at ready shewn, that the great end of morali ty can never be carried on, by leavingeach particular person to pro mole the public good, in such a mann eras he shali thinli mosi convenient, without prescribing certa in determinate, universal rules to be the common mea lare os morat actions: and,if we allow the necessity of these, and at the same time think it lawsul totransgress them, whene ver the public good mali stem to require it, whatis this, but in Hords indeed to enjoin the observation os morat rules, hut in effect to leave every one to be guid ed by his own judgmenti than whicli nothing can be imagine d more pernicio us and destructive to man-kind, as liath been atre ady proved. Secondiy, this fame pol ni may be collected stom the example set ias by the aut hor Os nature, Who, as we have above observed, acts according to certa in fixed la s, which he will nottrangress upon the account of accidental eviis arising Dom them. Suppost a prince, on whose life the wellare of a hingdona depends, to falldown a precipice, We have no reason to thinii, that the universal law of gravitation would be suspended in that case. The like may be seid ofali other laws of nature, Which we do not find to admit os exceptions onparticular accountS.
XXVIII. And, as without such a sleadine si in nature, We mouid seon, instead of this beauti l frame, see nothing hiat a di sorderly, and confused chaos: so is once it heco me current, that the morat actions of men arenot to be guided by certain definite inviolabie rules, there Will be nolonger
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longer soland that beau ty, order, and agreement, in the system os rational beings. or morat wortii, which will then be ali covered over withdarlanesi and violetice. It is true, he who stands close to a Palace, Canhardly malle a right judgment of the architecture and symmetry of iis severat Paris, the nearer ever appearing dis proportionably great. Andis we have a mind to talae a Dir prospect of the order and generat Well- heing, whicli the inflexit,le laws of nature and morali ty derive on theworid, we must, is I may so say, go Out Os it, and imagine our lves tobe distant spectators of ali that is transacted and contained in it; other i se we are lare to be deceived by the too near vie w of the litile present in
ing of what hath been sald Will, I thin k, afford a clear solution to thesellowing difficulties. XXIX. First, it may perhaps seem to se me, that in consequence of the foreming doctrine, men Will be lest to their o n private judgmentsas much as ever. For, si rit, the Very being of the laws of nature, secondiy, the criterion where by to knOW them ; and, third ly, the agreement of any particular precept with that criterion, a re ali to be disco vered by re ason and argumentation, in Whicli every man doth necessari ly judge r himself: hence upon that supposition, there is Place sor ag great confusion, unsteadiness, and contrariet y of opinion S and actions, as u pona ny other. I aras er, that ho e ver men may differ, as to What weremost proper and beneficiat to the public to be done or omitted on particular occasions, when they have for the most part narrow and interested vieius :yet in generat conclusions, dra n Do m an equat and enlarged vie w of
ali amongst candid, rational en quirers after truth.
XXX. Secondiy, the most plausibie preten ce of ali against the doctrine we have premi sed concerning a rigid indispensabie observation os
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morat rules, is that whicli is unded on the consideration os the publicweal: sor since the common good of manliind is confessedly the endwhicli God requires mould be promoted by the Dee actions of men, it may scem to follow, that ali good men ought ever to have this in vi ew, as the great mark to which ali their ende avours mould be directed i is there re in any particular case, a strict keeping to the morat rule mali prove manifestly inconsistent with the public good, it may be thought agreeable to the will of God, that in that case the rule does res rain anhonest disinterested person, from acting for that end to whicli the rule it-self was ordat ned. For it is an axiom, that the end is more excellent thanthe means, whicli deriving their goodnesse stom the end, may not come incompetition with it.
XXXI. In answer to this, let it he observed, that nothing is a Lismerely because it conduceth to the public good, but because it is decreed by the will of God, whicli alone can give the sanctiori os a lam os natureto any precepi: nei ther is any thing, how expedient or plausible ever. to be esleemed la fui on any other account, than iis being coincident With, Or not repugnant to, the laws promulgated by the voice of natureand reason. It must indeed be allowed, that the rational deduction ostliose laws is Munded in the intrinsic tendency they have to pro mole thewell-being of manliind, on condition they are universalty and constantly observed. But though it aster ards comes to past, that they accidentallylail of that Cnd, or even promote the contrary, they are nevertheleia bind-
in g, as liath been atready proved. In mori, that whole difficulty may beresolved by the solio ing distinction. In Daming the generat laws of nature, it is granted, we must bc enti rely guided by the public good os man-kirid, but not in the ordinary morat actions of our lives. Such a rute, is universalty observed, hath from the nature of things, a necessary fit-nese to promote the generat well-being of mankind: there re it is a law
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doth in this instance produce much good, and no harm to mani induethere re it is lawful: this were wrong. The rule is framed with respect to the good of manliind ; but our practice must be always sma pedim media tely by the rule. They who thin k the public good of a nation tobe the sole mea re of the obedience due to the civit po er, stem not toliave considered this distinction. XXXII. Is it be se id that se me negative precepis, e. g. thou Rali nothin, do admit os limitation, since other isse it were unia fui sor the magistrate, for a soldier in a batile, or a man in his own defence, to kill an-Other : I answer, when a duty is expressed in too generat terius, as in this instance, in order to a distinct declaration of it, ei ther tho se terms may bochanged for others of a more limited sense, as lili sor muriri or et se Dom the generat proposition remaining in iis fuit latitude, exceptions maybe made of those preci se cases, whicli not agreeing With the notion ofmurder, are not prohibited by the law of nature. In the former casethere is a limitation, hut it is only of the signification os a single termtoo generat and improper, by substituting another more proper and particular in iis place. In the lalter case there are exceptions, but then theyare not stom the law of nature, but stom a more generat proposition, Which besides that law, includes sonaewhat more, whicli must be talienaway in order to leave the law by itself clear and determinate. Fromnelther of whicli concessions will it sollo that any negative law of nature is limited to those cases ora ly where iis particular application promotes the public good, or admits ali other cases to be excepted stom it, where in iis being actualty observed produceth harm to the public. Butof this Ι mali have occason to say more in the sequel. I have norudone with the first head , which was to fhew, that there is an absolute, utili mited passive obedience due to the supreme power, Where- placed in any nation ; and come to en quire in to the groundsand
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Dis urse V Postve Obedience. 27
and reasons os the contrary opinion : which was the second thingProposed. XXXIII. One great principie, whicli the pleaders sor resistance mahethe ground-work of their doctrine, is, that the law of self-preservation is prior to ali other engagemenis, being the very first and fundamental la Of nature. Hence, say they, subjects are obliged by nature, and it istheir duty, to resist the cruei attempts of tyranis, ho ever authoriged by unjust and bloody laws, whicli are nothing else but the decrees of men, and consequently must give way to those of God or nature. But per-haps, is Ne narro ly examine this notion, it will not be found so just and Clear as seme men may imagine, or, indeed, as at first sight it stems to be. For We ought to distinguissi belween a two-sold signification of the termslu natura ; which words do either deoote a rule or precept sor thedirection of the voluntary actions os rea nable agenis, and in that sensethey imply a duty; or else they are u sed to signisy any generat rute, which we observe to obtain in the works of nature, independent of the wilis of men , in whicli sense no duty is implied. And in this last acceptation, I grant it is a generat law of nature, that in every animal therebe implanted a destre of selsepreservation, whicli, though it is the earli est, the deepest, and most lasting of ali, whether natural or acquired appetites, yet cannot with any propriety be termed a morat duty. But is in the formersense of the words, they mean that selsepreservation is the first and most fundamental law of nature, whicli there re must talie place of ali other natural or morat dulies: I thinh that assertion to be manifestly false, sorthis plain reason, bccause it would thence solio , a man may lawfullycommit any sin Maat e ver to preserve his lise, than whicli nothing canhe more absurd.
XXX lV. It cannot indeed be dented, that the law of nature restra insus frona doing those things which may injure the lise of any man, and E et consequently
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Consequently our o n. But, notis illislanding ali that is seid of the obligativenesi and priori ty of the law of selse preservation, yet, sor ought Ι
servation to be the firsi and most necessary of ali the positive or assirmative laws of nature; yet, forasmuch as it is a maxim allowed by ali moralisis, that evit is never to be committeri to the end good may come of it, it will thence plainly sollow, that no negative precept ought to be transegressed for the salie os observing a positive one ; and there re, sincewe have mewn, thou Dait not resist the supreme pomer, to be a negative laruos nature, it is a necessary consequence, that it may not be transgressedunder pretence of fulsit ling the positive duty of selsepreservation. XXXVI. A secorid erroneous ground of our adversaries, whereon theylay a main si rest, is that they hold the public good os a particular nationto be the meast re of the obedience due frona the subject to the civilpower, whicli theresere may be resisted when ever the public good mali verily stem -to require it. But this pol ni hath been atready considered, and in truth it can give smali dissiculty to whoe ver understandsloyalty to be on the sanae seot With other morat duties et oined in ne- ative precepis, ali Whicli though equalty calculated to promote the generat Hell-being, may not ne Verihelest be limited or suspended underpretexi os giving way to the end, as is plain stom What hath been premi sed on that subject.
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can transfer that to another, which he hath not himself ; theresere, sinceno man hath an absolute unlimited right o ver his own lik, the subjectcannot transfer such a right to the prince or su preme power) who consequently hath no such unlimited right to dispose of the lives of his subjects. In case there re a subject resist his prince, who acting accordingio law, maheth an unjust, though legat, attempt oti his life, he does him no
preme pOWer may consonantly to reason be resisted; hecause that although such resistance wronged not the Prince or supreme power Where ever placed, yet it were injurious to the author os nature, and a violation of his law, whicli re ason obligeth us to transgress Upon no account liat ever, as liath been demonstrat ed.
pugners of non-resistance, arises Dom the natural dread os 1lavery, chains, and fetters whicli inspireS them With an aversion sor any thing, whicli even metaphoricatly comes under those denominations. Hen cethey cry out against us that we would deprive them of their naturalsreedom, that we a re mahing chains sor man kind, that we are for ensiav-ing them, and the like. But how harsh e ver the sentence may appea yet it is most true, that our appetites, even the most naturat, as os Case,plenty, or li se iistis, must be cha ined and setiered by the laws of nature and
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reason. I his savery, is they wili cali it se, or subjection of our passions to the immutabie decrees of reason, though it may be galling to the sensual pari or the beast, yet lare I am, it addeth much to the digni ty of that whicli is peculiarly human in our composition. This leads me to the fifth fundamentat error. XXXIX. Namely, the mistaking the object of passive obedience. Wemould consider, that when a subject endures the insolence and oppression of one or more magistrates, armed with the supreme civit power, the object of his submission is, in stri et truth, nothing else but rightreason, whicli is the voice of the author os nature. Thinli not we areso sensetest, as to imagine tyranis cast in a helter mould than othermen: no, they are the worst and vilest of men, and for their own salies have not the least right to our obedience. But the laws of God and nature must he obeyed, and our obedience to them is never more accepta-ble and sincere, than when it exposeth us to temporal calamities. XL. A si xth salse ground of persuasion to those we argue against , istheir not distinguissi ing between the natures of positive and negative du-ties. For, say they, since our active obedience to the supreme civilpower is achnowledged to be limited, why may not our duty of non-resistance be thought so toot The answer is plain; because positive and negative morat preceptS a re not of the fame nature, the former admitting suci, limitations and exceptions as the lalter arre on no account liable io, ashath been atready proved. It is very possibie that a man in obeying the commandS of his la fui governors, might transgress seme lais of God contrary to them; whicli it is not possibie ser him to do, merelyby a patient suffering and non-resistance sor conscience falle. And thiqfurnis hes such a satisfactory and obvious solution of the forementioneddissiculty, that I am not a litile surpriged to see it insisted on, by men, other isse, of good sense and reason. And se much for the grounds and